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ABSTRACT
Opportunities for women in the military continue to expand. At some
point in the future, the Marine Corps may be compelled to address the
assimilation of women into combat arms occupational specialties. Existing
high attrition rates in the Marine Corps' infantry specialties indicates a
flawed selection and assignment process resulting in a poor fit of the person
to the job. Because of gender differences, this problem will be magnified
when women are incorporated into the infantry MOSs. This thesis identifies
those gender differences and recommends predictors that could be used to
better select personnel for the infantry military occupational specialties.
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In its report to the President dated 15 November 1992 the
Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the
Armed Forces, with ten members of the appointed panel voting
for and two members abstaining, made the following
recommendation
:
The sense of the Commission is that women should be
excluded from direct land combat units and positions.
Further, the Commission recommends that the existing
service policies concerning direct land combat exclusions
be codified. Service Secretaries shall recommend to the
Congress which units and positions should fall under the
land combat exclusions.
Over a year has passed since this recommendation was made and
there is no legislation which would bar women from direct land
combat by statute. The Commission also recommended service
policies that prohibited women from flying combat aircraft be
retained and the corresponding legal prohibition that was
repealed in 1991 be reinstated. However, this recommendation
was brushed aside by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin in April
1993 when he ordered the services to begin selecting and
training women to fly combat aircraft. The same fate could
befall the Commission's recommendation concerning women and
direct ground combat at some future date.
The prevailing mood in the United States Marine Corps
regarding women in direct combat roles is reflected by
testimony given by Major General Gene A. Deegan on 25 June
1992 to the President's Commission on Assignment of Women in
the Armed Forces.
First, the combat restrictions should not be repealed.
Second, it is pure lunacy to consider involuntary
assignment of women to the infantry. The vast majority
are physically incapable of such an assignment. An
individual that advocates such a policy simply does not
understand the rigors of close combat, the unique spirit
required for success on the battlefield, and the physical
limits of even the exceptional women that serve in our
Corps today. Third, I am also opposed to the voluntary
assignment of women as infantrymen. However, the
rationale is much more difficult to articulate or
quantitatively prove. I will admit up front that my
position is based both on facts and gut feelings.
Currently, there is no "contingency plan" in the Marine Corps
that addresses how women would be assimilated into combat arms
occupational specialties should current policy be changed at
some future point by administrative, legislative or judicial
decree. Failure to plan for such a momentous reversal of
policy could have as its end result a severe degradation of
combat readiness in units that have previously been all male.
This thesis does not advocate assigning women to direct
combat roles nor does it argue for the current policy ban to
be maintained. It examines the history of women in the Marine
Corps. It identifies factors that differentiate the two
genders and discusses why these factors must be addressed.
The Canadian model of integrating women into infantry units is
examined. Finally, the main thrust of the thesis is the
construction of a framework, which emphasizes the optimization
of combat readiness, for selection and assignment of women
that could be implemented if the Marine Corps' infantry combat
arms specialty is opened to women.
B. TIMELINESS AND RELEVANCE OF THIS STUDY
1. Background
The role of women in the armed forces of the United
States of America is undergoing a period of dynamic change.
Expansion of quantities of women serving and job opportunities
available to them has flourished since the advent of the All
Volunteer Force (AVF) in December 1973. In terms of
quantities, the number of women in the armed forces has
increased from less than 2 percent of the total force at the
end of fiscal year, 1972 to 11.6 percent of the total force at
the end of September 1992. (Presidential Commission Report,
1992, p. 48). This numerical increase to a figure of 210,048
occurred in part because the services had difficulty
recruiting qualified males and began recruiting more women
rather than lowering standards in order to "qualify" more
males (Holm, 1992, p. 253).
Women have also seen their opportunity to serve in a
wider variety of occupations increase significantly. During
the last two decades the movement for equal rights for women
and demands for equal opportunity in all fields in the
civilian sector have been paralleled in the armed forces.
This was recently highlighted when Secretary of Defense Les
Aspen announced on 28 April 1993 that the Department of
Defense policy ban on women in combat aircraft would be
lifted, effective on that date. He also announced that
Congress would be asked to repeal the law prohibiting women
from serving on Navy combatant ships. This culminated in the
announcement that hundreds of women would begin serving aboard
aircraft carriers in June 1994 (USA Today, December 2, 1993,
p.4A) . The only bastion yet to be scaled is the ban on women
serving in ground combat roles, which involve seeking out,
reconnoitering, and engaging the enemy in offensive actions.
Military members of the last generation would have
been surprised if it had been possible to gaze into the future
and see the advancements that military women have made since
World War II. During World War II, at peak strength only
17,000 Women Army Corps members served overseas with the
overwhelming majority being volunteers for assignment to duty
outside the United States. Not until 1945 were women members
of the Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard permitted to serve
overseas and then only in certain American territories and not
on foreign soil. At war's end, 4,000 WAVES and 1,000 women
Marines were serving in Hawaii—all were volunteers. In 1948
the Armed Forces Integration Act limited the numbers of
enlisted women in the military to 2 percent of enlisted
strength. It also imposed a ceiling for women officers that
limited their promotional opportunity to Lieutenant Colonel in
the Army, Air Force and Marine Corps or Commander in the Navy.
Not until 1967 did Public Law 90-130 repeal the above
limitations. In 1976, Public Law 94-106 opened up the service
academies to women.
Women were first allowed to serve aboard naval ships
in 1978 with the modification of Section 6015 of Title 10.
Public Law 95-485 permitted women to be permanently assigned
to ships not expected to be assigned combat missions, and also
to be assigned for up to six months of temporary duty on other
Navy ships.
In December 1989, 770 military women deployed to
Panama in support of Operation Just Cause. During the
operation, Army Captain Linda Bray led thirty soldiers of her
988th Military Police Company in a three-hour, infantry-style
firefight. This led military sociologist Charles Moskos to
state that Bray's command of troops in a combat operation in
Panama was "a shot heard around the world, or at least in the
Pentagon." Also during Operation JUST CAUSE two Army female
helicopter pilots came under heavy fire while flying their
Black Hawks and eventually received Air Medals with the "V"
for valor.
As the scope of JUST CAUSE paled beside that of DESERT
SHIELD/DESERT STORM so did the quantities of women deployed.
During the United States campaign to rid Kuwait of the Iraqi
army, 41,000 women, or more than 7 percent of American forces
in theater, were deployed in the country's largest scale
operation since Vietnam. Women service members piloted
helicopters over Iraq, directed Patriot missiles and loaded
laser-guided bombs on combat aircraft. As well as guarding
prisoners of war, American women were taken as prisoners of
war by Iraqi forces. Noteworthy praise was given to the
performance of women in DESERT STORM by high ranking American
officials and military leaders.
Women have made a major contribution to this war effort,
said Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney when the Persian
Gulf War was over. We could not have won without them.
General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the Coalition Forces
commander, said they were magnificent.
2. Proponent Arguments for Women in Combat
The goal of the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in
the Services (DACOWITS) continues to be that the Secretary of
Defense and the services should have the flexibility to fully
utilize all qualified personnel based on ability rather than
gender (Holm, 1992, p. 474). This goal requires that service
members should be judged as individuals, not as blacks or
whites, not as Hispanics or Jews and not as women or men
regardless of job specialty. All people desiring to serve in
any military specialty should be treated as individuals, not
as members of a group. This equal opportunity concept for
women to bear the hardships of war can be traced back to Plato
who wrote about the "equality of women" in his Greek classic,
Republic . He argued that women should be expected to take
their fair share of civic responsibilities and that men and
women should receive the same education and share equally in
all public duty. He further states that women who have the
"right natural gifts" should not be debarred by difference of
their gender from fulfilling the most important functions.
Women "must have the same two branches of training for mind
and body and also be taught the art of war , and they must
receive the same treatment." When the state actually goes to
battle, "men and women will take the field together."
One example of a woman who "took the field" with men
in DESERT STORM is Major Rhonda Cornum, an army flight surgeon
who was shot down during a helicopter rescue mission behind
enemy lines. One of three survivors of the eight person crew,
Major Cornum was taken prisoner by Iraqi forces and
subsequently sexually molested. Major Cornum was eventually
freed at the conclusion of hostilities. When asked for her
opinion about women in combat she offered this as part of her
statement for the record to the Presidential Commission on the
Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces:
A soldier needs physical and moral courage, ingenuity and
integrity, determination and loyalty, a sense of humor,
and of course luck, to be successful in combat. I do not
believe and did not see any evidence that these qualities
are distributed on the basis of gender.
Many groups are quick to point out that denial of
combat billets to women severely impacts their promotional
opportunities. The percentage of women in the higher officer
and enlisted ranks is disproportionate with the numbers of
women in the military. There is more disparity if medical
officers, which includes nurses, are excluded. The services
maintain that the disparity exists because large numbers of
women did not begin entering the military until the mid-1970s
and that given time, the distribution of women at the higher
ranks will begin to approximate that of men. But, if combat
billets remained closed to women, there should continue to be
a lower proportion of women in the senior officer and enlisted
grades
.
Sexual harassment, and in particular the gross abuses
that occurred at the 1991 Tailhook convention, are being
linked with the ban on women in combat units. Anna Quindlen,
a New York Times columnist, wrote that "if you treat women
like second-class citizens by denying them entrance to combat
positions, your male personnel will get the idea that they can
treat them like second-class citizens in other ways, too."
This statement is striking in its similarity to that voiced by
Representative Patricia Schroeder, a member of the House Armed
Forces Committee, who said that the real lesson of the scandal
was that "so long as women are excluded from combat roles and
cannot participate as full partners they will be seen as
second-class citizens." Retired Admiral Elmo Zumwalt known as
the officer who broke the back of the Navy's race problem
through aggressive actions in the 1970s echoed these same
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statements during testimony for an Armed Services hearing in
July 1992 when he insisted that the combat ban had helped
shape the attitude of male service members toward women.
Congressman Les Aspen reflected a similar attitude at these
hearings when he said, "The combat arms are the essence of
each service. The whole promotion system and prestige in the
service is oriented to combat arms."
3. Public Opinion
Eitelberg writes "if there is to be any pressure on
the military or Congress for widening the role of women, it
would most likely come from sources external to the defense
establishment
—
perhaps from public opinion or other social
forces pushing for fair treatment and equal rights."
(Eitelberg, 1990, p. 24) In 1978, a Gallup poll found only 19
percent of survey respondents who felt that women should be
eligible for combat roles (Gallup, 1979, p. 150). In 1980,
survey respondents answering the same question showed a
marginal increase to 22 percent (Gallup, 1980, p. 145). A poll
conducted by the National Opinion Research Center in 1982
revealed that one of three respondents supported the use of
women as soldiers in hand-to-hand combat (Davis et al,1982,
p. 35). A New York Times and CBS News poll conducted in 1990
asked the following question: "Do you think women should be
allowed to serve in combat units if they want to, or don't you
think so?" Of those surveyed, 72 percent said that women
should be allowed to serve in combat units (Sciolino, 1990,
p.D.6). In 1992 the Roper Organization administered a survey
called "Attitudes Regarding the Assignment of Women in the
Armed Forces: The Public Perspective" and found the following
results:
• 47 percent opposed the current military policy not to
assign women to any direct combat positions.
• when asked whether women should be assigned to ground
combat, 45 percent said only if they volunteer, 25 percent
said women should be required to take the assignment, 27
percent said that women should not be assigned, and three
percent did not know.
• 75 percent agreed with the statement "if a women meets the
qualifications required by a direct combat assignment, the
military should be able to assign her there." (Roper,
1992, p,27)
Survey results vary based upon such factors as timing
and phrasing of the questions. However, there appears to be
a noticeable shift among the American public over the past
decade with increasing numbers of the population in favor of
allowing women access to direct combat roles.
C. APPROACH
The selection and recruiting procedure that the Marine
Corps currently uses to designate its recruits as 03s
(infantrymen) is examined. Because physical differences
between the two genders are frequently referenced as a primary
reason chat women are not allowed in combat arms specialties,
these differences are discussed. Aggression is examined in
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relation to any difference, real or perceived, between the
male and female psyche. The cognitive predictor that the
Marine Corps currently uses to assign enlistees to the
infantry occupational specialties is identified.
The Canadian military was ordered to open all military
occupational specialties to women in 1990. Success rates for
women attending their infantry training schools have been very
low. The Canadian model is examined for strengths and
weaknesses in regards to the recruitment of women to attend
basic infantry training, the selection process that was
applied to the recruiting pool, and training that the women
received prior to beginning infantry school. Last, attention
is focused on training problem areas confronting women and
leading to their attrition.
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. What are the differences between the "average" male
and the "average" female that could impact combat readiness?
How are Marine recruits selected and assigned to the infantry
military occupational specialties? Should the Marine Corps
adapt additional predictors for assigning recruits to infantry
occupational specialties to reduce attrition?
2. What lessons in terms of recruiting, selection, and
training can be gleaned from the Canadian model? What
procedures should be ready for implementation to access women






This chapter provides a historical overview of the
utilization of women in the Marine Corps as well as current
Marine Corps' policy regarding classification and assignment
of women. It will also address physiological and aggression
level differences between the two genders. Also, the
Canadian model of selecting, training and assimilating women
into previously all-male units will be introduced.
B. WOMEN IN THE MARINE CORPS: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
1. Pre-World War II
The first women to wear the Marine Globe and Anchor
entered the Corps in 1918. This was necessitated because of
high Marine casualties on the battlefields of Europe which
caused a requirement for more combat personnel. Women were
brought into the Corps to assume clerical jobs freeing male
Marines to be assigned to combat. The 3 05 women who joined
the Marines in August 1918 were nicknamed "Marinettes" a
derivative of the Navy's term "Yoemanettes" for their female
sailors. The "Yoemanettes" had entered the Navy in March of
1917 prior to the United States becoming involved in World War
I. While the Department of the Navy authorized women in the
Navy and the Marine Corps, the War Department determined that
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the Army could not enlist women for any purpose other than as
nurses.
With the end of World War I on 11 November 1918, the
immediate demobilization of Navy and Marine Corps women began.
By the end of 1919 there no longer remained any women on
active-duty in the Marine Corps. In 1925 Congress changed
the wording in the Naval Reserve Act of 1916, which had
authorized enlisting "citizens" into the Navy and Marine Corps
to now limit eligibility for military service to "male
citizens." This restricted the Navy from enlisting women
without prior approval from Congress.
This exclusion of women from the military continued
until World War II when the issue was once again brought to
the forefront as the services faced possible manpower
shortages due to combat casualties. On 30 July 1942 Public
Law 689 was signed authorizing the establishment of the Navy
Women's Reserve and the Marine Corps Women's Reserve. The
Navy women were to be identified as WAVES, an acronym for
Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service. Marine women
were given no "nickname" and, as per the instructions of the
Marine Commandant, Lieutenant General Thomas Holcomb, would be
called "Marines." In November 1942 General Holcomb
recommended to the Secretary of the Navy that "as many women
as possible should be used in noncombat billets thus releasing
a greater number of the limited manpower available for
essential combat duty" (Marine Corps Women's Reserve in World
14
War II, 1968, p. 3)
.
By May 1943 women Marine officers and enlisted
personnel had completed training at Navy WAVE schools. In
July 1943 the Marine Corps established the Women Reserve
Schools at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina where over eighteen
thousand enlisted women and 821 women officers were trained
until the end of World War II. The first director of the
Marine Women's Reserve, Colonel Ruth Cheney Streeter, was
responsible for the successful integration of women Marines
into more than 200 separate occupational specialties and
billets at every major Marine Corps post in the continental
United States (Heinl, 1977, p. 243). But, not until the
closing months of World War II were women Marines allowed to
deploy "overseas" and were then assigned to the Hawaiian
Islands.
At the close of the war General Holcomb gave women
Marine's the credit for putting an entire Marine division in
the field. Without women filling support roles stateside
there would have been insufficient numbers of male Marines to
form an extra division. At war's end, women Marines were
filling 87 percent of the enlisted jobs at Headquarters,
Marine Corps and comprised 3 3 to 50 percent of the troops at
many Marine bases in the continental United States (Holm,
p. 101). Demobilization of the Marine Women's Reserve began
shortly after the end of the war. By 1947 approximately 100
women Marines remained on active duty with all being assigned
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to Marine Corps Headquarters.
2. The Women's Armed Services Integration Act of 19 48
The Marine Corps showed no interest in maintaining
large numbers of women on active duty in a peacetime
environment. Marine Director of Plans and Policies Brigadier
General Gerald C. Thomas stated in October of 194 5 that "the
opinion generally held by the Marine Corps is that women have
no proper place or function in the regular service in
peacetime. This opinion is shared with the Director of Marine
Corps Women's Reserve (Colonel Ruth C. Streeter) and a
majority of the Women Reserves." He further said that "the
American tradition is that a women's place is in the
home. . .women do not take kindly to military regimentation" and
"during the war they have accepted the regulations imposed on
them, but hereafter the problem of enforcing discipline alone
would be a headache" (Stremlow, p.l). That "headache" became
a reality on 12 June 1948 when President Truman signed Public
Law 625, the Women's Armed Services Integration Act, which
established a permanent place for women in the Army, Navy, Air
Force and Marine Corps. While this law placed no limit on the
number of women who could serve in the Reserves it limited the
number of women in the Regular service branches to no more
than two percent of each service. The Marine Corps was given
a guideline for 1950 to not exceed 100 officers, 10 warrant
officers and 1,000 enlisted women.
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Public Law 625 was ambiguous concerning the role of
women in combat and left to each Service secretary's
discretion how women would be utilized. However, the intent
of Congress was evident in the law's direction that in the
case of the Navy and Air Force women "may not be assigned to
duty in aircraft while such aircraft are engaged in combat
missions; nor, in the case of the Navy may they be assigned to
duty on vessels of the Navy except hospital ships and naval
transports" (Holm, p. 120).
Recruit training for Women Marines (WM's) , their title
as designated by a Marine Corps Memorandum dated 16 November
1948, was moved from Henderson Hall at Marine Corps
Headquarters in Arlington, Virginia to Parris Island, South
Carolina in January 1949. First Platoon of the 3d Recruit
Training Battalion began training on 2 March 1949 and
graduated on 12 April 1949. The platoon's drill instructors
were three male Marines who provided instruction in close
order drill, first aid, chemical warfare and the general
orders. The first Women Officer Training Class graduated at
Quantico, Virginia on 9 September 1949 with thirty-four women
receiving their commissions of which seven were Regular
commissions.
3. The Korean War and Pre-Vietnam Era (19 51-19 64)
At the beginning of the Korean War in July 1950 there
were five hundred and eighty women Marines on active duty. In
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order to free male Marines for combat roles this number
significantly increased during the next two years and peaked
at 2,787 in September 1953. After 1945 and prior to the
Korean War, with the exception of two recruits who were
assigned as photographers, all women Marines were assigned to
administrative occupational fields. However, the reguirement
for women to be utilized in a wider range of billets was
guickly recognized. In April 1952 after a study by the
Procedures Analysis Office, military occupational specialties
that were considered appropriate as well as unsuitable for
women were promulgated and are detailed in Table 1. At the
close of the war in July 1953 women Marines were again serving
on most Marine posts in the continental United States and
Pearl Harbor as well as being assigned European duty in
Stuttgart, Germany. No women Marines, however, were assigned
to Korea.
After the war, women continued to serve in the twenty-
seven occupational fields opened during the war. But, the
majority were concentrated in personnel administration (4 5-55
percent) , supply, communications (telephone operators)
,
disbursing, data processing, post exchange, and public
information. In 1955, only 5 percent of enlisted women
received formal training of any kind (Stremlow, p. 63) . In
1963, 771 women completed recruit training but only five were
sent to a service school. The remainder reported immediately
to their permanent duty station. Women officers after
18
commissioning received a six-week Woman Officer Indoctrination
Course compared to the male second lieutenant's nine-month
training package at the Basic School. The fifties also saw
the first women attend Drill Instructor's School at Parris
Island. Five women completed the course in 1955 but were not
allowed to carry a rifle during drill sessions. However,
Headquarters Marine Corps, uneasy about a loss of femininity
and image, nixed the idea and women did not return to the
school for twenty-one years (Stremlow, p. 118).
4. Vietnam Era (1964-1972)
In August 1964 Marine Commandant Wallace M. Greene
ordered the creation of a study group to "propose a program to
render the peacetime service of women Marines of optimum
benefit to the Marine Corps" (Stremlow, p. 71) . This group
became known as the Pepper Board named after its chairman,
retired Lieutenant General Robert H. Pepper. Among its
recommendations that were approved were women's assignment to
a broader range of occupational fields to include drafting,
lithography, operational communications, communications
maintenance, auditing, finance, accounting, informational
services, air control, and flight equipment. Women began
receiving orders to service schools immediately after recruit
training instead of proceeding to their permanent duty
station.
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With the advent of the Vietnam War and Congressional
approval of a 30,000 increase in the Corps' end strength,
numbers of women Marines began to increase. A peak of
approximately 2700 women on active duty was reached in 1968
and 1969. In July 1966 a decision was made to assign women to
the western Pacific to free men for combat duty and to provide
women Marines with some career incentives. The first women
Marines arrived on Okinawa in October 1966 and were followed
at Iwakuni, Japan with another contingent in March 1967.
The most dramatic event of this period was the first
assignment of a woman Marine to a combat theater which
occurred on 18 March 1967. Master Sergeant Barbara J.
Dulinsky was the first of thirty-seven women Marines (eight
officers and twenty-nine enlisted) to serve in Vietnam from
1967-1973. Women Marines were carefully selected for Vietnam
assignment and were in fact required to volunteer by notifying
their commanding officer or by indicating the request on their
fitness report. The women were assigned to fill desk billets
at the Military Assistance Command based in Saigon. They
worked with the Marine Corps Personnel Section on the staff of
the Commander, Naval Forces, Vietnam and were tasked to
provide administrative support for Marines in Vietnam. In
contrast with the one year tour that male Marines fulfilled in
Vietnam, women Marines were assigned to six-month tours and
could volunteer for a six-month extension.
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5. Early All-Volunteer Force Era (1973-1979)
The Navy and Marine Corps began to invest more time
and resources in providing women with equal opportunity with
the advent of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) and demands from
the national women's liberation movement. Also, many new
occupational fields become available when in 1975 Marine
Commandant General Louis H. Wilson approved the assignment of
women to all occupational fields except infantry, artillery,
armor and flight crews. Appendix C and D lists numbers and
percentages of women Marines, officer and enlisted, and the
military occupational specialties to which they were assigned
in 1976.
6. The Eighties and Desert Shield/Desert Storm
In the 1980s women began receiving training at recruit
depots involving participation in defensive combat operations.
Also, women Marines began serving as members of Marine
Security Guard detachments stationed at various embassies
overseas. In 1984 the Commandant approved the results of the
Women Review Board which focused on classification, assignment
and deployability of women Marines. Those results included
the establishment of the ideal enlisted women Marine strength
at about 10,500 and that women would continue to serve in all
major commands, both Fleet Marine Force and supporting
establishments. Marine Corps Order (MCO) 1300. 8P discussed in
the next section was written as a result of this review.
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During DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, 2,178 women on
active duty and ninety-eight women reservists deployed to the
Persian Gulf. Women Marines served as administrators, air
traffic controllers, logisticians, engineer equipment
operators, communication center operators, radio technicians,
supply administrators, drivers, military policemen and guards.
Women Marine truck drivers operated in northern Saudi Arabia
and some went into Kuwait to deliver supplies and transport
enemy prisoners of war to holding facilities. In Motor
Transportation Battalions, women Marines commanded companies
and platoons. This first operational test of women Marine
classification, assignment and deployment policies in an
actual combat theater was termed an "unqualified success."
7. Current Policy
On 28 April 1993 Secretary of Defense Aspin announced
a policy designed to open up more specialties and assignments
to women in the armed forces. The new policy contained three
elements. First, it opened combat aircraft to women. Second,
it opened additional non-combatant ships to women and directed
the Navy to prepare a proposal for Congress to remove the
legislative ban on women serving on combatant ships. Third,
it directed the Army and Marine Corps to review their
assignment policies and identify more assignments that could
be opened for women. As a result of this announcement, the
Marine Corps began selection of candidates for flight training
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based on a gender-neutral basis with men and women being
assigned on a best qualified basis. All aircraft were open to
women but assignment as forward air controller and
battalion/regimental air officer remain closed to women
(pilots) because of those individuals and units involvement in
direct combat on the ground. Also, the Marine Corps opened
seventeen ground military occupational specialties (Tables 2
and 3) and two units (Table 4) that were previously closed to
women
.
On 28 January 1994 Secretary of Defense Les Aspin
announced new policy guidelines for assignment of women and a
new definition of direct combat. Since President Clinton
signed legislation repealing the law barring women from
serving on combat ship in November 1993 and women can fly
combat aircraft, the Risk Rule that barred women from serving
in non-combat units where the risk was as great as that in
combat units was deemed "overtaken by events." Thus, the Risk
Rule was rescinded effective 1 October 1993. A new Department
of Defense definition of direct ground combat was also
issued. Direct ground combat was defined as having to meet
all three of the following criteria: 1) engaging the enemy on
the ground with weapons, 2) being exposed to hostile fire and
3) having a high probability of direct physical contact with
the personnel of a hostile force. Women are prohibited in
serving in units that engage in direct ground combat. With
this policy announcement the Marine Corps began a review of
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all military occupational specialties and units closed to
women. These MOS ' s and units are listed in Tables 5 and 6.
Appendix E and F lists numbers and percentages of
women Marines, both officer and enlisted, and the military
occupational specialties to which they were assigned in
January 1994.
C. WOMEN IN THE CANADIAN FORCES (CF)
1. Historical Perspective
Canadian women first entered the Canadian military as
nurses in 1885 and served in the Canadian Northwest Rebellion,
the Boer War and World War I. Their roles expanded in World
War II as they served as anti-aircraft gunners, pilots,
mechanics, and signallers (Canadian Mixed Gender Employment
Leadership Guide, 1992, p. 26). Based upon recommendations by
the Royal Commission on the Status of Women convened by the
Canadian government in 1971, CF employment policies were
changed to include women in all occupations with the exception
of near combat, isolated locations, and service at sea. This
resulted in an increase from 19 percent to 66 percent of
military occupations being open to women.
In 1978 the Canadian Human Rights Act prohibited
discrimination in employment on the grounds of gender. It
stated that "sex is not a permissible reason for
discrimination unless it is based upon a bona fide
occupational requirement" (Lamerson, 1989, p. 2). This
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resulted in the CF beginning an immediate investigation of the
feasibility of employing women in non-traditional occupations
from which they were previously excluded. A five-year trial
known as Servicewomen in Non-Traditional Environments and
Roles (SWINTER) was initiated to determine the operational
impact of employing servicewomen in sea, land, and air near-
combat units and at isolated locations. In 1986 after
reviewing the SWINTER results the Chief of Defense opened an
additional fourteen military occupations to women and opened
several previously all-male units to servicewomen already
employed in mixed-gender occupations. This brought the
proportion of occupations in which women could be employed to
75 percent (Lamerson, p. 2). The only areas remaining that
were restricted to women were anti-submarine, fighter, and
tactical helicopter squadrons in the Air Force; infantry,
artillery, armored, field engineer, signal and field
intelligence units in the Army; and destroyer and submarine
fleets in the Navy. In February 1987, the Minister of
National Defence announced plans to study these remaining
areas that had remained closed to women.
A Director General of Combat-Related Employment of
Women (CREW) was appointed to initiate activities and "to
develop trial options with the objective of determining which
single-gender units and military occupations could be opened
to mixed-gender employment without reducing operational
effectiveness" (Lamerson, 1989, p. 3). Recruiting and training
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for combat occupations comprised only 6 percent of the total
recruit group, which was substantially lower than the 20
percent of applicants to the CF who are women.
Concurrent with the initialization of the CREW trials,
the Canadian Human Rights Commission formed a tribunal to
determine if the trials were legal and constitutional. The
tribunal began its deliberations in May 1988 and passed its
judgement in February 1989. That judgment decreed "that the
employment of women in combat occupations should not be a
trial, but should be a policy decision" (Lamerson, 1989, p. 3).
Thus, the CF emphasis changed from measuring the impact of
mixed-gender combat units on combat readiness to one of
facilitating a smooth and positive integration of women into
those same units. Currently, all Canadian Force occupations
and areas of employment, except submarines, are open to women.
2. SWINTER Trials
The SWINTER trials began in November 1979 and ended in
October 1985. The primary purpose of the trials was to
identify the social-psychological lessons resulting from
introduction of women into previously all-male, military
operational environments (Park, 1986, p. 3). Servicewomen were
assigned duties in four operational areas that had previously
been closed to women. These included field service support to
primary land combat operation units stationed in Europe,
service at sea aboard a non-combatant ship, support to a
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primary land combat operation units stationed in Europe,
service at sea aboard a non-combatant ship, support to a
communications station located aboard the Arctic Circle and as
aircrew at transport or transport and rescue squadrons (Park,
1986, p.l). The focus of this section will be on the service
support units assigned to land combat operations hereafter
referred to as "Land Trials."
Women involved in the Land Trial tests were assigned
to a Field Ambulance Battalion and a Service Battalion. Both
units provided direct support to a Combat Mechanized Brigade
Group, which was tasked to act as a blocking force in event of
enemy breakthrough in the German area of operations. Women
assigned to the two battalions varied in representation
between 6 and 15 percent of each unit. The women involved,
ranging in rank from private to Captain, were expected to
perform the same combat-related duties as the men. All women
posted to the Land Trial Battalions were volunteers and were
required to complete attitudinal surveys prior to assignment.
These surveys were designed to obtain information regarding
the women's personal backgrounds, career and organizational
commitments, and attitudes toward SWINTER and women's roles,
in general.
A comparison of the volunteers ' surveys with those who
declined to participate in the trials revealed that the
volunteers tended to be different from their non-volunteer
counterparts. Servicewomen who volunteered were more
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approving of women's involvement in the military and expressed
greater support for "traditional" military values such as
putting operational concerns ahead of one's personal life.
For example, the non-volunteers were three times more likely
than the volunteers to indicate that they "would probably
refuse or try to avoid going into combat" (Park, 1985, p. 70).
While volunteer servicewomen most frequently cited the
opportunity to do something different as their primary
motivation for accepting a Land Trial posting, they were also
firm in proclaiming that they were not out to open up new
employment for women.
The only physical requirement was that the women had
to be at least five feet two inches tall and weigh at least
127 pounds. The rationale for these selection standards was
to ensure that women had sufficient muscle mass to physically
perform field tasks. However, the standards did not include
aerobic fitness or a height/weight ratio and some women were
posted who were obese and/or not physically fit (Park, 1985,
p. 7).
During the trial period, the Canadian Forces Personnel
Applied Research Unit (CFPARU) in conjunction with on-site
Social/Behavioral Sciences Advisors (SSBA) prepared research
reports documenting specific data collected as part of the
evaluation. Also, key personnel such as commanding officers
and immediate supervisors assessed the women's performance
using operational criteria. At a minimum, semi-annual reports
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documenting the progress of the Land Trials were submitted by
the SBSA throughout the trial period.
At the conclusion of the Land Trial tests a content
analysis of interview comments suggested that a "functional,
yet somewhat guarded, mutual acceptance" had developed between
the men and woman of the two trial units. A slight majority
(56 percent) of the male respondents and most female (74
percent) gave positive assessments of servicewomen '
s
performance and impact (Park, 1985, p. 22) . Women appeared to
have been integrated more satisfactorily into the Ambulance
Battalion than into the Service Battalion. That unit's
emphasis on medical skills vice physical strength appeared to
better facilitate the women's integration. In the Service
Battalion the inability of certain women to cope physically
was seen as a continuing obstacle to women being fully
accepted. Other factors inhibiting their acceptance were
their lacking the necessary training and motivation for land
field posting and a reluctance on the part of the men to
accept the idea of women as combatants.
Overall, SSBA used two criteria to judge the success
of servicemen's and servicewomen ' s social integration. First,
did the men demonstrate acceptance of women both in their
survey answers and in their behavior toward women or did they
attempt to keep women segregated? Second, did the women
perceive that they had been fully integrated into their units
and did they fully participate in unit taskings and
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activities? The SBS concluded that the groups did not achieve
a satisfactory social integration. At best the conclusion was
that women were "accommodated not accepted" (Park, 1985,
p. 39). Their findings pointed to three primary sources
hindering complete and satisfactory integration. These
include: 1) servicewomen s selection and training for field
duties; 2) servicemen's unfamiliarity with and resistance to
accepting women in previously all-male, combat roles; 3) and,
organizational factors precluding or limiting integration
efforts (Park, 1985, p. 41).
Regarding the selection and training of women for
field duties Park notes:
Certain servicewomen were faulted for their lack of
physical strength, disinterest in field duties, and/or
inadequate tactical motivation. These three problem areas
reflect deficiencies in the women's selection and training
for field duty. Women's physical inability to handle all
field tasks provoked the greatest tension between men and
women, and represented the major obstacle to women's
acceptance. Specific tasks (i.e. , lifting stretchers int
o an ambulance, loading and unloading full propane
bottles, setting up a kitchen truck, and carrying boxes of
ammunition) requiring lifting or carrying were repeatedly
cited as being beyond the capability of most women in
their respective trades. Whereas some women performed
most capably, other women took additional time to complete
tasks, or "discriminating leadership" was shown in which
supervisors ensured that the weaker women were paired with
strong men. Servicemen were not pleased with either
solution and argued that preferential treatment was being
shown (Park, 198 5, p. 42).
Previous studies (Amir, 1969) have proposed that when
integrating a minority group with a dominant group the
minority group will face difficulty being accepted if they do
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not have equal status on variables that are important with the
dominant group (Park, 1985, p. 42). Thus, men who consider
physical strength to be an essential factor in field
operations were not sympathetic with servicewomen who argued
that they could use alternate strategies to accomplish the
task or that they were among the top performers in their
specialty. The servicewomen themselves acknowledged that "the
bigger women are more capable and stand a better chance of
surviving." Park concludes that the physical standards used
to screen women for the land trial were not adequate and that
the integration attempt would have had a better chance of
success if the two genders had been on more equal footing.
The evaluation also identified that some of the
servicewomen exhibited a distaste or disinterest in field
duties, which impacted the overall acceptance of women. A
significantly larger number of women than men (70 vs. 20
percent) stated that they had not expected field life to be as
it was (Park, 1985, p. 44). Park states that a more stringent
screening of applicants, both male and female, wishing to join
the Canadian Forces could minimize the number of individuals
not inclined to serve in the field.
In conclusion, the SBS adopted the following policy
recommendations pertaining to selection and training of women
into non-traditional positions/mixed-gender units:
a. The socialization of women to prepare them for
employment in the land environment must begin at the
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recruitment stage. This preparation should include
informing potential applicants of their liability for
serving in field units. Advertising designed to attract
civilian women to apply, and information provided at
Canadian Force Recruiting Centers, should follow the
"realistic expectations" approach. As a result,
individual women having little inclination for such
employment may well exclude themselves from applying to
the Canadian Forces.
b. The principle of preparedness through proper selection
applies also to the implementation of realistic and
appropriate physical selection standards. This method of
ensuring that all personnel selected for a given trade are
largely capable of performing static Base as well as field
tasks would allow for the formation of a mutual trust and
acceptance as equal
.
c. Additional environmental and fitness training may be
necessary for both servicemen and servicewomen. Such
training would be particularly important during the
initial stage of their career to prepare them more
completely for later duties and to allow them to assume
all assigned trade tasks in various environments. This
recommendation is consistent with existing policy in which
individuals throughout their careers are tested and
identified as requiring remedial fitness training. Other
such programs might be necessary. (Park, 1985, p. 54)
3. CREW Trials
Approval for the CREW trials was granted in June 1987.
It was directed that the trials consist of comparisons between
mixed-gender and single gender (male) combat units in the
infantry, artillery, armor, signals and field engineers. The
primary issue was whether the integration of the two genders
would effect a unit's ability to perform its mission. If
decrements were identified in the performance of the mixed-
gender units, a secondary issue was if the decrease in
efficiency was due to the mixed-gender composition of the
unit. Measurement of unit effectiveness was the target of the
trials not measurements of individual skills.
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The trial plan outlined the following guidelines in
order to ensure there was a sound operational and scientific
basis for the trial: 1) all participants would meet the same
enrollment standards and receive identical training , 2) women
would be posted to units in sufficient numbers to provide each
other social support and also have a clear impact on the unit
as a whole, 3) sufficient time would be necessary to conduct
an evaluation, and 4) more than one training cycle per unit
would be needed for observations (Lamerson, 1989, pp. 1-2).
The plan allowed for a one year integration phase after
training and then a two year evaluation phase. Data
collection for the trials included field observation,
recording of archival data, assessment by the chain of command
as well as questionnaires and interviews.
Recruiting and training for the trials began in April
1987. Female applicants numbered only 6 percent for combat
occupations, which was significantly lower than the 20 percent
of applicants to the Canadian Force who are women. This
served to slow the process and prior to the evaluation phase
beginning, the Canadian Human Rights Commission in February
1989 ruled against the trials and for immediate integration of
women into combat occupations.
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D. PHYSIOLOGICAL GENDER DIFFERENCES
1. Body Composition
Body composition and size have a significant impact on
the performance of physically demanding tasks. The body is
composed of non-fat and fat tissue mass. Non-fat mass is made
up of skeletal and smooth muscle mass. That which is not
muscle mass is known as body fat and is measured as a percent
of body weight (percent body fat) or as a mass (body fat in
pounds) . Table 7 compares 1984 military recruits and reveals
that the average female recruit is 4.8 inches shorter, weighs
31.7 pounds less, and has 37.4 pounds less muscle mass and 5.7
pounds more fat mass than the average male recruit
(Presidential Commission, 1992, App.C p. 3).
Similar results were found by Fitzgerald in 198 6 and
Vogel in 1992. Their data revealed that the average female
soldier weighs 20 percent less than the average male soldier,
has 10 percent more body fat and 30 percent less muscle mass
(Sharp, 1993, p. 3). Because an individual's body composition
and size affect fitness and physical performance, the average
female is at an inherent disadvantage in performing demanding
physical tasks when compared with the average male. The
female's larger quantity of body fat does not contribute
directly toward muscular activity. Additional fat can be
likened to "dead weight" and can be compared to carrying
excess baggage. This, combined with a concurrent lower muscle
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mass, places women at a distinct disadvantage when performing
military tasks requiring muscular strength.
Table 8 illustrates the correlation between physical
performance and body composition. There is a positive
correlation between aerobic activities such as the two mile
run and body fat percentage (higher body fat percentage
correlates with slower two mile run times) . There is also a
positive correlation between strength activities and fat free
mass (ability to lift greater weight correlates with higher
percentage of fat free mass) . Because women have more body
fat and less muscle mass they are more likely to have slower
run times and lower strength levels (Sharp, 1993, p. 4).
2. Muscular Strength
Strength is defined as the maximal force a muscle or
muscle group can generate at a specified velocity (Sharp,
1993, p. 4). The maximal force produced at zero velocity is
defined as isometric strength . This contrasts with dynamic
strength , which is maximal torque exerted against a resistance
to include isokinetic (controlled velocity) and isotonic
(uncontrolled velocity) strength.
In terms of isometric strength, women produce 60 to 70
percent of the isometric force of men (Knapik, 1980, p. 1086) .
There is a greater isometric strength disparity in the ratio
of upper body strength (.6) than lower body strength (.67)
when comparing women with men. This correlates with the
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female-to-male ratio of muscle mass which is . 65 for the legs
and .59 for the arms (Sharp, 1993, p. 5).
Studies show that while the average female is not as
strong as the average male, some women are stronger than some
men. This is illustrated by Figure 1 and is even more evident
in Figures 2 and 3 when strength is measured relative to body
weight and fat-free weight. As Figure 3 shows, the results
are most similar when strength is corrected for differences in
muscle mass. This supports the conclusion that there is a
similar ability of muscles to produce force between the
genders but the quantity of muscle mass available to produce
force differs.
Dynamic measurements of strength are often more highly
correlated with job performance than measures of isometric
strength (Sharp, 1993, p. 6). Tests given to measure dynamic
strength range from lifting, pressing or pulling a maximum
amount of weight on a weight machine to lifting a maximally-
loaded box from floor to shoulder height. A United States
Navy study with the results shown in Figure 4 revealed that
the dynamic strength of women ranged from 4 6 to 58 percent
that of men (Presidential Commission, 1992, Appendix C, p. 4).
This supports the results shown in Figure 5, which illustrate
that the female-to-male strength ratio for a maximal lift on
a weight stack machine is .50. This strength differential
lowers when women were asked to raise a maximally-loaded box
from the floor to shoulder height. In this dynamic strength
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test women were able to lift .60 as much as men
(Sharp, 1993, p. 6) . Sharp writes that it takes two women to do
the work of one man in terms of single measures of maximum
strength. This has been demonstrated with both a college and
an Army population group. In a college age sample the
isokinetic strength of two women was 101% that of one man
(Sharp, 1992, p. 2). In a sample of Army soldiers, the dynamic
lifting strength of two women was 114% that of one male
soldier (Sharp, 1992, p. 2).
3. Muscular Endurance
Muscular endurance is defined as the ability to
maintain an isometric contraction, or to perform repeated
submaximal dynamic contractions at a specified percentage of
maximal strength (Sharp, 1992, p. 2). An example of muscular
endurance would be continual loading of a fifty-pound
ammunition box into a truck at a proscribed rate. When
exercising at a given percentage of their maximal strength,
females demonstrate equal or greater endurance than male
exercising at a given percentage of their maximal strength.
For example, the average women lifting a box requiring 3
percent of her max strength will maintain power output as long
or longer than a man lifting a box requiring 3 percent of his
max strength. The disparity in muscular endurance arises when
women have to use a greater percentage of their maximum
strength than the average man. The fifty-pound box will cause
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a women to work at a greater percentage of her strength
capacity than an average man lifting the same box. This
results with women becoming fatigued faster than men when
handling a same weight load.
4. Cardiopulmonary Capacity
An individual ' s maximal aerobic power has a direct
effect on the capacity to perform physical activity over an
extended period of time. Maximum aerobic power is measured as
maximal oxygen intake (also known as V0
2
max) , which is defined
as the highest rate at which the body can utilize oxygen.
High V0
2
max measurements correlate with an individual '
s
ability to sustain submaximal exercise lasting longer than
five minutes. This measurement can be taken during physical
activity such as running, forced marching, cycling, and
swimming. V0
2
max differences between the genders is caused
due to women having a smaller heart mass, smaller heart
volume, lower cardiac output and lower hemoglobin levels than
men.
Women have 6 percent fewer red blood cells and 10 to 14
percent less hemoglobin than men. The increased
hemoglobin concentration in men enables them to circulate
more oxygen per unit of blood. There are also differences
in a woman's capacity to pump blood through the system.
A woman's maximum cardiac output , or the quantity of
blood pumped by the heart per minute, is 3 percent less
than a man's cardiac output. Cardiac output is determined
by two factors: stroke volume and heart rate. Stroke
volume is the quantity of blood pushed out of the heart
with each beat. Women have a smaller heart and heart
volume than men. Because stroke volume limits cardiac
output, a woman's heart rate will be higher than a man's
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heart rate at any given cardiac output. In order to
maintain an equivalent supply of oxygen to working
muscles, a woman must increase her cardiac output to make
up for a decreased oxygen capacity (i.e., a lower
hemoglobin content) (Sharp, 1993, p. 11).
Also, the difference in each gender's fat-free mass and body
fat impact aerobic capacity. The combination of the above
results in women having a lower capacity than men to perform
aerobic exercise at a set rate. This is true whether expressed
in absolute terms (.71), relative to body weight (.73) or
relative to fat free mass (.88) (Sharp, 1992, p. 3). For
example, during a constant-paced forced march women would
exercise at a higher percentage of their aerobic power,
generate greater increases in heart rate, oxygen intake and
heat production, which would result in faster fatigue and a
greater risk of heat injury than men. (Sharp, 1993, p. 10).
E. PERSONALITY GENDER DIFFERENCES (AGGRESSION)
1. Definition and Overview
Prior to the mid-1970s studies abounded concerning the
supposed aggression level differences between the genders.
The overwhelming majority of those studies indicated that in
every society in which men and women differ in aggressiveness,
men are more aggressive (Tavris, 1977, p. 54). Several of the
studies will be encapsuled with attention directed toward
gender aggression differences among children and adults and
why there is a variance in aggression levels. For the
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purposes of this paper aggression is defined as actions that
are intended to cause injury (Nicholson, 1984, p. 159).
2. Aggression Level Differences Among Children
Many studies show that males of all ages engage in
more physical aggression, fantasy aggression, verbal
aggression and play aggression than females (Tavris, 1977,
p. 54). This behavioral sex difference is found in a variety
of cultures (Maccoby, 1974, p. 228). A cross-cultural work
reported in 1974 detailed behavior observations in six
cultures (Kenya, Okinawa, Philippine?, India, Mexico, and the
United States) with the subjects divided into two age cohorts,
children from three to six and children from six to ten. In
all cultures and both age groups, boys engaged in more "mock
fighting" (rough and tumble play) , exchanged more verbal
insults and were more likely than girls to counterattack if
aggressed against in either verbal or physical form (Maccoby,
1974, p. 228)
.
A similar study conducted by Omark, Omark, and Edelman
involved playground observation of 950 subjects ages four
through ten in the United States, Ethiopia, and Switzerland.
A greater incidence of aggressive behavior defined as hitting
or pushing without smiling was found among boys in all three
societies (Maccoby, 1974, p. 228).
These studies are indicative of a group of
observational studies reported on between 1967 and 1973. Of
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fourteen studies only one found girls to exhibit higher
observations of aggression (Maccoby, 1974, p. 230). This
study, done by Blurton Jones, was conducted with twenty-five
subjects ages three and four with frequencies of rough and
tumble and aggressive play being recorded (Maccoby, 1974,
p. 4 15). Blurton Jones reported that his results appeared to
be atypical and upon doing further observations with a larger
sample, but which included the original twenty-five children,
the usual higher level of aggression in boys was found
(Maccoby, 1974, p. 228).
Experimental studies involve the research scientist
confronting subjects with tasks in a sterile setting as
opposed to observational studies, which are pure observations
of unelicited behavior in a natural setting. Results found in
experimental studies are very similar to those found in
observational studies. Of nineteen studies reported on
between 1967 and 1973 involving children ages three to eleven,
only two registered any indication that girls behaved more
aggressively than boys. The majority found boys to exhibit
higher levels of aggression. A representative study was one
conducted using a film that shows an adult attacking an
inflatable doll and being praised for his or her actions
(Hicks, 1968, pp. 303-309). The children were then sent to an
experimental room where they were given similar inflatable
dolls. In these circumstances the boys tend to punch the doll
five times more than the girls.
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Another way of measuring aggressive tendencies is by
asking children what they think instead of observing their
normal and coerced actions. Rating scales and questionnaires
are used to identify any differences between the sexes. In
nine studies that included self-reports and interviews with
parents and teachers, eight found that boys appeared to be
more aggressive than girls, two reported no difference, and
none found that girls were more aggressive than boys (Maccoby,
1974, p. 233). Typical of results found with these studies
are the findings of Walker who utilized a rating scale with
teachers, subjects and their peers to measure temperament
traits. 450 children age eight to eleven were used as
subjects. The children rated themselves on ninety-six self-
descriptive statements—sixteen for each of the following
traits: energetic, surgent, social, stable, fearful and
aggression. The results were that teachers viewed boys and
boys viewed themselves as more aggressive and energetic and as
less fearful than girls (Maccoby, 1974, p. 610).
3. Aggression Level Differences Among Adults
Measurements of aggression among adults has been
accomplished through experimental studies and with
questionnaires. As with children, the preponderance of the
studies lead one to conclude that males are the more
aggressive of the two genders. The majority of the
experimental studies with adults involved the administration
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of "shock" to a confederate in a laboratory setting. An
experiment conducted by Shuck in 1971 is representative of
other studies. Shuck measured sex differences in aggressive
behavior of forty college age subjects subsequent to listening
to a radio broadcast of violence. The subjects were asked to
shock a confederate when a wrong answer was given in a
learning experiment. Men administered higher levels of shock
than women (Shuck, 1971, pp. 921-926) . This validated a
similar study conducted in 1965 that also dealt with the
administration of shock to a confederate who made an incorrect
response in a learning task. Forty college-age students were
used as subjects. As with the Shuck study, men delivered
higher intensities of shock than women (Epstein, 1965, pp.
585-589) . Of the thirteen experimental studies reported
between 1965 and 1973 involving subjects age eighteen and
over, men exhibited more aggression in nine of the studies,
no difference was ascertainable in three of studies, and women
demonstrated a higher aggression level in one of the studies
(Maccoby, 1974, pp. 232-233).
Similar to the results of questionnaires administered
to children, adult males see themselves as much more
aggressive than women (Nicholson, 1984, p. 163). A study
conducted by Wagman measured sex differences in types of
daydreams involving 206 college age adults. Men reported a
higher frequency of aggressive, hostile and heroic daydreams
than women, while women reported a higher frequency of
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passive, practical and planning daydreams than men (Wagman,
1967, pp. 329-332) . Projective tests have also been used to
compare aggression levels of the genders. The premise of this
type test is that the feelings one ascribes to others reflects
how the man or women feels. An example is a group of subjects
being shown a picture of a motorist getting out of a car that
has just crashed into the motorist's car. The subjects are
asked what the motorist is about to say. On all these tests
men emerge as significantly more aggressive than women
(Nicholson, 1984, p. 166).
More recently during Desert Shield in December 1990,
men were evenly divided on whether to attack Iraqi forces in
Kuwait (48 percent both for and against) . However, women
opposed military action by 73 to 22 percent. A similar gap
existed during the air phase of Desert Storm. Men approved
the tactic by fifty-seven to forty percent while women
decisively opposed air strikes by sixty-three to twenty-nine
percent (Howes, 1993, p. 28).
Real-life or observational studies testing the belief
that men are more aggressive than women are limited.
Available studies tend to support the idea. Group violence,
whether on the streets of large cities or in sporting events
deemed "violent" such as football, is basically a masculine
event (Nicholson, 1984, p. 166). Also, crime statistics can be
cited to advance the theory that the genders differ in
aggression levels. In virtually all societies where
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statistics are kept, male participation in violent crime
exceeds that of females on the order of 9:1, which implies
much higher levels of aggression for men (Hooker, 1989, p. 50)
.
4. Biological Foundation for Gender Aggression
Differences
The findings that males are more aggressive than
females has not been well-received by some groups. They argue
that the studies are inconclusive because young women in
America are taught to inhibit aggressive behavior while male
aggressive behavior is reinforced. Essentially these groups
attribute any supposed difference in gender aggression to
learned behavior, and suggest that what is learned can be
modified. Maccoby, while not denying the environmental
effects on aggression differences, traces the differences to
a biological foundation.
Let us outline the reasons why biological sex differences
appear to be involved in aggression: (1) Males are more
aggressive than females in all human societies for which
evidence is available. (2) The sex differences are found
in early life, at a time when there is no evidence that
differential socialization pressures have been brought to
bear by adults to "shape" aggression differently in the
two sexes. (3) Similar sex differences are found in man
and subhuman primates. (4) Aggression is related to
levels of sex hormones, and can be changed by experimental
administration of these hormones. (Maccoby, 1974, pp. 242-
243)
Maccoby gives examples of prenatal females who are exposed to
abnormally high levels of male hormones being "masculinized"
both physically and behaviorally. This happened with humans
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when genetic feamles received excessive amounts of male
hormones prenatally due to abnormal activity of the fetus '
s
adrenal glands or when there was injection of male hormones to
the mother during pregnancy. With animals, it was shown that
introduction of testosterone to female rodents increased their
aggression level in adulthood. Maccoby also cites a study in
which female rhesus monkeys were administered testosterone and
became more aggressive than male monkeys who were untreated.
Before the testosterone was introduced, the male monkeys had
been more dominant and aggressive than the females.
Maccoby writes that it is highly likely that there is
a biological component underlying sex differences in
aggression, but like all behavior, aggression is subject to
social shaping and undergoes successive modification through
learning (Maccoby and Jacklin, 1980, p. 964). She also states
in her earlier work that "in almost every group that has been
observed there are some women who are fully as aggressive as
the men." (Maccoby, 1974, p. 247) However, she feels that
though there are many myths about sex differences, the strong
link between aggressive behavior and sex represents an
exception in the spectrum of psychological differences
(Maccoby and Jacklin, 1980, p. 977).
F. SUMMARY
This chapter has traced the ever expanding role of women
and their contributions to the Marine Corps from World War I
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to the present. It has also examined literature that
discusses gender differences from a physical and aggression
level perspective. Canadian experience involving problems
generated when women enter previously non-traditional jobs has
also been reviewed. Though women have made tremendous strides
in the military, American females may face their toughest
challenge when tasked to assimilate into infantry positions,
which demand high states of physical readiness and a
personality conducive to "seeking out, closing with and
destroying the enemy."
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III. SELECTION AND ASSIGNMENT: THE ARMY, ASVAB, AND
CANADIAN FORCE EXPERIENCE
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter focuses on the importance of selection and
assignment of personnel who have a high probability of job
success in specific occupational specialties. In the 1980s
the United States Army conducted a study involving necessary
strength requirements for groupings of job specialties. Its
objective was to match the job with a person physically
qualified to meet the job's physical requirements. This
study and its results, which became known as the Military
Entrance Physical Strength Capacity Test (MEPSCAT) , will be
reviewed. Also, a Center for Naval Analysis study that
identified the best cognitive predictor of success in the
infantry field using a particular section of the ASVAB test
will be discussed. Last, the Canadian model involving how the
Canadian Forces assimilated women into their infantry will be
analyzed. This model provides an excellent insight into
problem areas that can be expected unless appropriate
selection and assignment criteria are established before
assimilation of women into infantry occupational specialties.
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B. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SELECTION PROCESS
1. Overview
Selection is the process of choosing for employment a
subset of applicants available for hire (Muchinsky, 1993,
p. 141). Selection is based upon the premise that some
applicants are "better" suited for a particular job than
others. Matching these individuals to employer vacancies will
lead to better organizational efficiency and a more satisfied
employee. Selection decisions can be evaluated from both
institutional and individual perspectives. Institutional
criteria relate to how the hiring decision ultimately affects
the organization and is measured by increases in productivity,
reduced costs, or combat readiness for military units.
Individual criteria relate to how the hiring decision affects
the individual and is measured by feelings of accomplishment
and personal satisfaction. Hired applicants are judged to
have a higher probability of job success based upon their
meeting certain predictors that the organization has
established. These predictors are variables such as tests or
interviews that have been designed to correlate with the
actual job criterion. For example, a certain score on a
college entrance exam is used as a predictor for academic
mastery at the collegiate level, which is the criterion.
Predictors must be both reliable and valid. When predictors
have been established, the selection process can begin
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choosing the "right people" which will benefit the
organization and those selected personnel who have the
attributes to pursue their "right career."
C. UNITED STATES ARMY ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVE
SELECTION/ASSIGNMENT
1. Overview
A Government Accounting Office (GAO) study published
in 1976 involving the utilization of women in the military
revealed that some women were having difficulties with
physical tasks in some assigned specialties. This resulted in
higher than expected attrition rates for women because of job
dissatisfaction and reassignment of women to administrative
jobs. At this point, the Army screening procedure involved
the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) , a
medical examination, and a written questionnaire regarding
moral qualification. This information was then used for MOS
assignment. The GAO recommended strength testing of recruits
to allow recruiters to "match the right person with the right
job." The Army realized the benefit of a physical predictor
that could be used to reduce injury-related costs and reduce
costs of retraining soldiers not physically capable of meeting
job requirements for their chosen MOS.
In 1977 the Exercise Physiology Division of the United
States Army Institute of Environmental Medicine (USARIEM) was
tasked by the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel,
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through the Surgeon General's Office, "to develop, a battery
of physical fitness tests suitable for screening new
accessions for MOS classification" (Teves et al, 1985, p.iii)
.
The USARIEM is the Army Surgeon General ' s medical research and
development laboratory responsible for examining the physical
fitness needs of the Army (Pentagram, July 19, 1984, p. 28).
The study was conducted from 1978 through 1980 in response to
the tasking, and recommendations were submitted in September
1980. No action was taken at that time due to a perceived
adverse impact on personnel utilization. In 1982, the USARIEM
was again tasked to "develop and validate a gender-free
military enlistment physical strength capacity test" (Teves et
al, 1985, p.iii). This study, which became known as the
Military Entrance Physical Strength Capacity Test (MEPSCAT)
,
is detailed in the following sections.
2. The Military Entrance Physical Strength Capacity Test
The goal of the study that began in 1978 was to
develop valid screening procedures that were safe and easily
administered as well as not racially or sexually biased for
physically demanding jobs. The first step in the process was
to do a task analysis of the job that was designed to identify
the limiting tasks or requirements of the job. Task analyses
are conducted through surveys, interviews, and observation of
personnel who are currently doing the job as well as surveys
and interviews with their supervisors. The USARIEM conducted
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the task analysis by surveying and interviewing MOS training
school instructors to define and quantify the physical demands
of the 3 51 Army MOSs. Resulting from this analysis was a
classification system that considered aerobic capacity and
muscle strength requirements of the job. Aerobic capacity and
strength requirements were then divided into high, medium and
low categories. Then, all MOSs were grouped into five clusters
based upon strength and aerobic demands of the specific MOS.
These clusters with physical requirements are depicted in
Table 9.
Further studies were conducted in the 1978-1980 period
to develop predictive tests for aerobic and lifting capacity.
At Fort Jackson, South Carolina, a project used an interrupted
treadmill test to measure V02max or aerobic capacity. This
was then compared with a multiple regression equation using a
submaximal heart rate multiple step test, gender and percent
body fat. A squared multiple regression correlation
coefficient (R2 ) of .84 was obtained when using these three
variables compared with the actual V02max measurement obtained
with the treadmill test (Teves et al, 1985, p. 6). Because the
step test required special equipment and time to conduct, it
was deleted from the equation with a resulting decrease of
only .02 in R2 . This was interpreted to mean that gender and
body fat measurements would give a good estimate of actual
aerobic capacity.
At Fort Stewart, Georgia a project was undertaken to
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identify a predictor for lifting capacity. The criterion task
was the lift of a steel box to a platform 132 centimeters
high. Weight was added after each successful lift until the
subjects were unable to complete the lift. Then, six
isometric strength tests were administered to the same
subjects. The final multiple regression equation for
predicting lifting capacity included lean body mass, isometric
upright pull strength and gender. This was compared with the
the strength criterion task that had been measured by the
steel box lift. An R2 of .62 was produced (Teves et al, 1985,
p. 7) . This was interpreted to mean that an equation using
lean body mass, isometric upright pull strength, and gender
could be used to estimate an individual's strength capacity.
Because of these studies, it was recommended that a
skinfold test to measure body fat composition and an isometric
lifting test be implemented as part of the screening process
at Military Enlisted Processing Stations (MEPS) . This,
together with the MOS clusters, could be used for selection
and assignment. However, due to uncertainties of the impact
on manpower of any physical classification system, a decision
on implementation was deferred (Teves et al, 1985, p. 7).
In 1981, the pressure to match individual soldier
capacity with job demand resurfaced with the creation of the
Women in the Army Policy Review Group (WITA) . WITA
disregarded the USARIEM classification system shown in Table
9 and selected a modified Department of Labor (DOL)
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classification that divided jobs, based on physical
requirements, into five categories. These categories are
depicted in Table 10. This classification system is based
entirely on lifting capacity and does not consider aerobic
requirements. USARIEM was again tasked by the Office of the
Deputy Chief of Staff to repeat the selection and validation
of a strength capacity screening procedure based on the Army
modified DOL classification system.
Five items were considered in the attempt to identify
the best predictor for lifting capacity to meet job criteria.
These were:
• an exercise heart rate bench stepping test;
• a skinfold determination of percent body fat and lean body
mass
;
• an isometric 38 centimeter (15 inches) upright pull force
to measure static lifting strength;
• an isometric handgrip force that is indicative of whole
body strength; and
• a Maximal Incremental Lift to 152 centimeters (60 inches)
and 183 centimeters (72 inches)
.
The study was conducted in three phases. Phase I was
administered to 980 men and 1004 women recruits at Fort
Jackson, South Carolina in September and October 1982
immediately before the beginning of Basic Training. Phase II I
retested 89 men and 113 women of the original group in
November 1982 during the last week of Basic Training. Phase
III was administered to 466 men and 487 women of the original
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group from January to March 1983 toward the end of their
Advanced Individual Training. During Phase III a series of
generic criterion performance tasks including lifting,
pushing, pulling, carrying and twisting tests was administered
to the same soldiers. These were designed to represent the
physical demands of the MOS categories. The descriptive data
gathered in Phase I were then used to predict performance on
these criterion performance tasks. As a result, the ARIEM
found the incremental dynamic lift (IDL) to be the best
predictor of physical strength capacity required for
performance of the MOS-related job tasks (Pentagram, July 19,
1984, p. 28). The IDL required lifting a weight on a machine
to a height of sixty inches. This was deemed equivalent of
lifting a box onto the bed of a two and one/half ton truck.
An independent civilian agency, the Advanced Research
Resources Organization of Bethesda, Maryland concluded that
the MEPSCAT was a valid predictor of performance on physically
demanding tasks (Myers et al, 1984. p.viii)
.
3. MEPS Utilization of MEPSCAT
The Military Enlisted Processing Stations began
requiring applicants to take the MEPSCAT during in-processing
in 1984. At the MEPS, the lift was first demonstrated by the
recruiter. Then the applicant attempted to lift forty pounds
to a set mark in one continuous motion. (The lift is
analogous to the military press except that the lift stops at
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shoulder height for an individual sixty-seven to sixty-nine
inches tall) . Weight was then added in increments of ten
pounds until the lift could not be negotiated and the test was
stopped. The last weight lifted successfully was assigned as
the final score. The highest weight any applicant could
attempt was 110 pounds.
The physical demands classification shown in Table 10
was further grouped into only two categories—a light and
heavy cluster. The light cluster of jobs entail lifting
seventy pounds or less and the heavy cluster requires lifting
eighty or more pounds. The infantry MOS was classified as a
heavy cluster job. If an individual was unable to lift eighty
pounds but wanted an MOS in the "heavy" cluster of jobs, a
waiver could be granted. Inability to lift forty pounds was
not a disqualifier for enlistment. The MEPSCAT, together with
the ASVAB, was used by recruiters to match recruits to the MOS
for which they had the strength and cognitive ability to
succeed.
4. Abandonment of MEPSCAT
The Army's original intent was to use MEPSCAT as a
selection and assignment tool. However, it proved to be very
unpopular with the Army Recruiting Command because it added
additional hurdles for recruiters to overcome to recruit
enlistees. For example, 84 percent of the enlisted positions
available were classified in the heavy MOS cluster (Teves et
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al, 1985, p. 53). In the period between January and July 1983
when 99 percent of males qualified for the "heavy" MOSs, only
21 percent of the females qualified for the heavy cluster.
One-half of the females who qualified for heavy MOSs chose a
light cluster MOS. Of the females unable to lift eighty
pounds, 22 percent were granted a waiver to enter a "heavy"
MOS. With strict adherence to standards, the overwhelming
majority of women in the Army would be concentrated in a
fraction of the job specialties. Thus, the Army stopped using
the MEPSCAT for assignment and instead used it only as a
recruiting counseling tool.
In 1990 the MEPSCAT was eliminated altogether. In
testimony before the Commission on the Assignment of Women in
the Armed Forces on 6 April 1992 Colonel Dennis Kowal, Command
Psychologist for the United States Army Intelligence Command,
stated it was eliminated for political reasons (Commission,
1992, App.C, p. 13). In testimony before the same Commission
on 7 August 1992 Dr. James Vogel, Director of the Occupational
Health and Performance Directorate, USARIEM, stated its demise
was caused by a disagreement about whether standards should
reflect peacetime or wartime requirements (Commission, 1992,
App.C, p. 13). Sharp states in a 1993 report that the test's
effectiveness was never determined and it was dropped as a
cost-cutting measure (Sharp, 1993, p. 19).
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D. VALIDATION OF ASVAB AGAINST INFANTRY JOB PERFORMANCE
1. Overview
In 1981 a joint-service Job Performance Measurement
(JPM) was initiated to link military aptitude requirements to
objective measures of job performance (Mayberry, 1990, p.-v-) .
Hands-on performance tests (HOPTs) that required examinee's
to perform critical job tasks were used to measure job
performance. The Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) examined the
validity of the Armed Services Vocational Services Battery
(ASVAB) and composites of the ASVAB against infantry
performance measures that were collected as part of the JPM.
The following sections describe the ASVAB, the CNA analysis,
and the linkage that was found between a particular composite
of the ASVAB with hands-on performance of critical infantry
tasks.
2. The ASVAB
The ASVAB is used by the armed services to identify
students who potentially qualify for entry into the military
and for assignment to military occupations (ASVAB Counselor
Manuel, 1989, p. 2). It consists of ten subtests that are
listed and briefly described in Table 11. The Marine Corps
uses a summation of the Word Knowledge (WK) , Paragraph
Comprehension (PC) , Arithmetic Reasoning (AR) and Auto/Shop
Information (AS) scores to form a composite known as the
General Technical (GT) score which is used as a qualifier for
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assignment into infantry occupational specialties.
3. Conduct of the Analysis
Over 2100 Marines in infantry specific MOSs
participated in the test (Table 12) . The sample was
stratified by rank, educational level and length of service to
ensure appropriate representation of the infantry population.
Individual Training Standards (ITS) , developed by the
Training Department, Headquarters, Marine Corps, are used as
the primary source for job tasks that define the infantry
MOS. Because of time, resource, and personnel constraints,
an objective sampling procedure was used for the CNA test.
Hands-on tests were chosen which would be representative of a
Marine's ability to perform all infantry tasks based on his
performance on the subset of the ITS. These tests were
selected and refined by Marine Corps' job experts who ensured
that the test content represented infantry specialties as a
whole and was consistent with what is required on the job and
in combat.
Because the tests required a subjective judgement of
whether an individual performed a particular action, the most
critical component of the testing was the test administrator.
Retired Marine Corps staff-noncommissioned officers and
officers were chosen as the test administrators and trained
for two weeks in how to score the tests to ensure test
validity. Quality control measures were also used to
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guarantee standardized scoring. These measures included
multiple-administrator scoring of examinee performance, daily
computerized entry of performance data to check for
administrator leniency or drift and test administrator
rotation across testing stations to minimize systematic error
(Mayberry, 1990, p. 4).
The tests included a core set of infantry tasks such
as preparing a M2 03 grenade launcher for firing, assembling
and operating a PRC-77 radio, and installing a Claymore mine.
Also, unique tasks to a particular specialty were tested.
Examples of these are machinegunners preparing range cards for
the Mk 19 machinegun, mortarmen laying the 81mm mortar, and
riflemen firing the M16A2 rifle on a pop-up, quick response
range. Each hands-on test required approximately eight hours
to complete.
4. Test Results
Table 13 shows the validity of different ASVAB
composites against infantry performance measures using hands-
on performance tests. The Mechanical Maintenance (MM)
composite score that consists of the summation of the AR, EI,
MC and AS scores proved to have higher validity than the GT
composite in four of the five infantry specialties. In these
four MOSs, MM validitys were four or more points better than
GT validitys. This improvement of over 7 percent was
considered substantial enough for CNA to conclude that "the
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Marine Corps could benefit by revising its composite used for
infantry classification." (Mayberry, 1990, p. 26)
E. THE CANADIAN MODEL
1. Overview
The Canadian Forces' planned assimilation of women
into all military units was helped along by their Human Rights
Tribunal decision in February 1989. This decision ordered
that "full integration is to take place with all due speed for
both active and reserve force with complete integration except
submarines within the next ten years." Because the Canadian
Forces was given a ten-year period, the decision was made to
begin assimilating women on a "unit by unit" basis vice
integrating women into all units at a designated juncture.
The following sections identify how women were selected to
enter the Canadian infantry and discuss their training at
recruit training and infantry battle schools. It identifies
problems that women confronted at the battle schools and
concludes with recommendations made by the Director General,
Combat Related Employment of Women concerning how to improve
women infantry recruit success rates.
2. Selection Process
Canadian recruits are processed for military service
at Canadian Force Recruiting Centers (CFRCs) . The accepted
applicant also receives assignment to a particular
occupational field at the CFRC. Assignment is made after the
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recruit has taken an aptitude test, passed a medical exam, and
been interviewed by an officer at the recruiting center. The
cognitive test is similar to the ASVAB in that it provides
composite scores for different areas of aptitude. To qualify
for assignment to an infantry specialty, the recruit must
attain a minimum set score on the arithmetic and automotive
information categories of the test. Once this score is
attained and the recruit is certified medically sound, the
recruiting officer meets with the recruit. After an interview,
the officer assigns the recruit to his/her specialty choice or
informs the recruit that another specialty would be better
suited for that particular individual. After assignment, a CF
283 is compiled on each recruit. This provides a history of
the recruit to include medical category, test scores, a
military potential rating, and narrative comments on family,
education, work, activities, military occupation choices, and
a summary of the counseling the recruit has received.
3. Initial Recruit Training
This initial period of training conducted at Canadian
Forces Recruiting Schools (CFRS) can be correlated with
training received by Marine recruits at the Parris Island and
San Diego Recruit Depots. Canadian recruits are segregated
into units by gender and are exposed to different levels of
physical training. As at Marine recruit depots, these units
consist of individuals who will enter a wide range of
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occupational specialties after graduation from recruit
training. Though the women who will attend infantry battle
schools have been designated before beginning this initial
training, these women are required to meet only the female
physical standards, which are lower than the standards for the
male recruits. After completion of CFRS, recruits designated
to enter infantry training proceed to battle schools for
infantry specific training.
4. Infantry Battle Schools
Infantry battle schools for regular duty forces are
located at Cornwallis and St. Jean. The schools are twelve
weeks in length and entail rigorous training involving
infantry fighting skills. Physical training, including two
road marches of ten miles each, did not change with the entry
of women into the programs. The culmination of training is a
five to eight day field exercise involving detailed exposure
to field conditions involving "combat" scenarios. The last
twenty-eight hours at St. Jean involve trainees carrying
forty-five pound rucksacks, moving continually and getting
minimal sleep.
In the first two-year period following the opening of
the infantry occupational field to women, training failure
rates were very high. Of the eighty women assigned the
infantry specialty, 32 percent were released from the CF while
at recruit school, 18 percent were released while at Battle
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School and 44 percent were reassigned for failure to meet the
Battle School ' s standards during two attempts at training
(Munro, 1989, p. 2)
.
Women, an identifiable group, failed to achieve an
established minimum standard that 70 to 75 percent of another
identifiable group, men, were meeting. This problem with
female attrition was attributed to one or a combination of
three factors. These are: 1) a problem in the characteristics
of the identifiable group not meeting standards, 2) a problem
in the training of the identifiable group and/or 3) a
problem in the selection criteria for the identifiable group.
The most frequently cited reason for female attrition
at the Battle Schools was failure to meet physical fitness
standards. Also cited in order of occurrence as reasons that
females did not finish training were medical disqualification,
lack of motivation, stress-related incidents, and aggression
both lack of and too much. Because of the high rate of
attrition, a study was conducted to identify any
characteristics common to those females who have come closest
to finishing training. The study's secondary aim was to make
recommendations that might enable females to achieve greater
success in infantry training. Its tertiary aim was to
identify predictors that recruiting centers could use in the
selection process before assignment into the infantry field.
The study was begun with a review of CF 28 3, the
Applicant's Assessment file, which was prepared at the CFRC.
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Then, interviews were conducted with females and males who had
attrited from Battle School training. Last, interviews were
conducted with the Battle School training staff.
Many women who were interviewed did not feel they were
properly briefed at the recruiting centers regarding the
physical and emotional rigors that would confront them at the
Battle School. A large proportion felt the video tape that
was shown at the recruiting centers was not realistic in its
portrayal of Battle School. Most did not list infantry as
their first choice for a military occupation. Of those who
did, a percentage did so because they were frustrated with the
long wait to begin training for their actual first choice.
Others felt they were offered infantry because of the need for
female recruits to further Combat Related Employment of Women
(CREW) testing. A majority of the women voiced displeasure
that the physical training received at CFRS did not adequately
prepare them for the physical challenges that immediately
confronted them at the beginning of Battle School. Many of
these recruits stated that they arrived at the Battle School
at a lower physical conditioning level than male recruits.
This caused them to feel "left behind" both physically and
psychologically, which resulted in their low motivation and
subsequent failure. The women who were meeting Battle School
physical standards but attrited for other reasons also cited
physical reasons as the major problem confronting women.
These women who were meeting physical standards were failing
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to complete the training cycle for medical reasons or for lack
of motivation. Of those cited for lack of motivation, the
reason most frequently stated was that this was caused by a
lack of peer support. Because males saw the majority of
females failing to attain set physical standards, the women
who were meeting those standards felt that the males were
grouping all females together as physically unfit.
Males who did not finish Battle School training were
also asked about why females were having such a difficult time
completing the cycle. The most commonly cited reasons were
poor physical condition, lack of motivation, poor life
preparation and a lack of aggressiveness.
The Battle School staff was also interviewed
concerning their perceptions on why females were not
completing the training program. The large majority stated the
lack of physical endurance or conditioning evident in the
female recruits. This was attributed to a failure of the CFRS
for not adequately preparing female recruits by not allowing
them to do the same physical training as male recruits.
Others cited poor medical screening as the main reason for
females failing. Another reason cited was inadequate
counseling and information received by the female recruits at
the CFRCs, which contributed to them arriving at the Battle
Schools poorly prepared, both mentally and physically.
Because of this and further analysis, the Director
General of Combat Related Employment of Women (DGCREW) issued
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the following remarks and recommendations.
(1) Women of small physical stature and poor levels of
physical conditioning skills are being assigned into infantry
occupations. These women have no chance to succeed in training
because they cannot perform the tasks set in training even
with extra physical training. A recruiting and training
system that would be fairer to female recruits must begin with
the recruiting staffs. Recruiters must be made aware of the
difficulties female recruits are having in meeting the
physically-demanding training requirements of the infantry.
Only women who are in top physical shape have any hope of
finishing infantry training. DGCREW recommended that the
Director, Recruiting Services together with DCREW issue an
instruction to CFRCs providing general guidance on how to
assess military potential for infantry recruits.
(2) When there are only two or three women in a unit of twenty
to thirty, group cohesion is achieved at the cost of excluding
the women. When numbers of women are increased this does not
occur as frequently. Groups of six or more women per serial
are needed to provide psychologically important groups for
mutual support during training. Beginning in Recruit School
female infantry recruits, when there are ten or more, should
be grouped together into designated mixed-gender serials.
DGCREW recommended that a plan be developed to direct those
women selected by recruiters as suitable infantry recruit
candidates to the designated serials to achieve some semblance
67
of supportive group dynamics.
(3) The initial entry recruit schools have different physical
standards for males and females designed to improve their
level of physical fitness. These have not led to training or
employment difficulties in occupations other than infantry.
However, the Infantry Battle Schools expect all recruits to be
at the male recruit level of performance upon arriving at the
Battle School and then quickly move to a higher level of |
performance. Ability to do well on the obstacle course, to do
pushups, sit-ups, and chin-ups, and to move quickly on foot in
formation under the weight of personal equipment are essential
to the development of the mental and physical agility,
strength and stamina required for combat. Few women arrive at
the Battle Schools able to perform at the same physical level
as men resulting in most ceasing training within the first
weeks of Battle School training. DGCREW recommended that
female infantry recruits be required to pass the male physical
fitness standard at Canadian Force Recruiting Schools to
enhance their chance of success at the Infantry Battle
Schools.
F. SUMMARY
This chapter identified the importance of the selection
and assignment process in placing job applicants in job
specialties where they can attain job specific criteria and
standards. This "fit" contributes both to unit efficiency and
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reinforces an individual's self-satisfaction with the job.
The attempt made by the Army in the 1980s to use a physical
strength test as an aid in selection and assignment was
reviewed. Also, use of the ASVAB's MM composite score as the
best predictor to gauge an individual's capability to
effectively meet infantry training standards as measured by
hands-on testing was identified. Last, the attempt by the
Canadian Forces to assimilate women into the Canadian infantry
and the resulting problems, which can be traced to deficient
selection and assignment guidelines, were highlighted.
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IV. SELECTION AND ASSIGNMENT: MARINE CORPS PERSPECTIVE
A. INTRODUCTION
The focus in this chapter is on the selection and
assignment process from a Marine Corps' perspective. The
chapter identifies a current problem that could intensify with
assimilation of women into infantry MOSs and concludes with
strategies that could be utilized to confront the problem.
The assignment process begins with an applicant's
selection into the Marine Corps and subsequent classification
as an 03XX recruit. It ends with successful completion of
infantry training school. Personnel losses that occur prior
to completion of a Marine's first enlistment are termed losses
due to attrition. Attrition rates for infantry MOS Marines
are examined and contrasted with other MOSs. Because the
infantry MOS fields have such a high rate of attrition prior
to fulfillment of the initial contract, the idea is introduced
that there is an assignment problem at the present time. This
problem will be magnified with the integration of women into
infantry MOSs if the Canadian experience serves as an accurate
model. To prevent this from occurring and to decrease current
attrition rates, the Marine Corps needs to identify a better
method of selection of personnel to 03XX MOSs. Thus, the
Marine Corps warrior ethos is analyzed in search of predictors
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that can be used to better "fit" the right person into Marine
Corps infantry specialties.
A statistical analysis of gender differences in the GT and
MM composites of the ASVAB is presented. Given the CNA study
that MM is a better predictor than GT of successful
performance in the infantry , the concept will be introduced
that women will be at a disadvantage if accessed into the 03XX
field based solely on GT score. Last, the concepts of
successive selection, multiple hurdles, and predictor-
criterion relationship will be defined. These concepts will
form the basis for recommendations in Chapter V to better
select and assign personnel into the infantry occupational
fields.
B. MARINE CORP SELECTION AND ASSIGNMENT
In Fiscal Year 1993 the Marine Corps accessed 6884
recruits into infantry military occupational specialties.
These specialties include rifleman (0311) , Light Armored
Vehicle (LAV) crewman (0313) , machinegunner (0331) , mortarman
(0341) , assaultman (0351) and anti-tank assault guided missile
man (0352) . Table 14 lists minimum requirements for being
assigned an 03XX MOS. As Table 14 demonstrates, an applicant
with a minimum GT of 80 is "qualified" to be an infantryman,
machinegunner, or mortarman. The standards nominally increase
for those desiring to be LAV crewman or antitank missile men
—
the minimum GT rises to 90, vision must be no worse than
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20/200, correctable to 20/20 and a current driver's license
is required. The first stop of the 03XX is recruit depot
training at either San Diego or Parris Island. After "boot
camp" the Marine then proceeds to Infantry Training School at
Camp Lejeune, North Carolina or Camp Pendleton, California.
If successful here, the Marine receives orders to his first
permanent command, which is usually a Fleet Marine Force unit.
C. ATTRITION RATES
Attrition is the loss of enlisted personnel prior to
completion of the first term of enlistment. For the cohort
that entered the Marine Corps in fiscal year 1984, forty-two
percent of women Marines and twenty-six percent of male
Marines failed to complete their first term of enlistment
(Department of Defense, 1988, p. 63). This combined rate of
over 3 percent attrition of first-termers has been consistent
in the successive years through fiscal year 1993.
Table 15 provides attrition rates and percentages of the
original cohort who stay, by bi-annual period, of infantry
recruits who entered the Marine Corps in fiscal year 1989.
Period 1 is substantially higher than other periods because it
includes basic training where attrition is 12.39 percent.
As of 14 January 1994 there were 03XX enlisted personnel
on active duty in the United States Marine Corps. This MOS is
the largest in terms of numbers in the Marine Corps. After
infantry, the following occupational specialties rank two
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through five in order of enlisted population—communications
(25XX) , motor transportation (35XX)
,
personnel/administration
(01XX) and engineering (13XX) . Tables 16, 17, 18 and 19
provide attrition rates and percentages of the original cohort
who stay, by bi-annual period, for these MOS recruits who
entered the Marine Corps in fiscal year 1989. As with the
infantry breakdown, Period 1 is high because of basic training
losses.
Attrition rates for the above identified MOSs range 35 to
3 8 percent compared to more than 40 percent for infantry MOSs.
This high rate of attrition points to a problem in selection
in all of these job specialties. However, even more of a
problem exists for the 03XX field when considering where
attrition occurs. Examination at the eighteen month point
(end of period 3) reveals that the 03XX MOS lost more than 25
percent of its cohort to attrition compared to the other MOSs
that lose from 17 to 19 percent to attrition. After
considering that all MOSs lose 12.39 percent at basic
training, this equates to the 03XX MOS attriting close to 50
percent more of its initial entry force during their first
year and a half on active duty than the other analyzed MOSs.
This "front end" loss of personnel results in wasted training
funds and impacts accession targets by forcing recruiters to
fill slots that have resulted from attrition. Its effect on
those who have failed to meet their contractual obligation is
difficult to gauge. However, it is likely that those who do
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not "measure up" have a loss of self esteem and may have
problems finding employment after returning to the civilian
sector because of their early termination from the Marine
Corps
.
Women in the Marine Corps and the Army have consistently
higher rates of attrition than women in the Air Force and the
Navy (Table 20) . Though this could be attributed to a variety
of factors, one possibility is that these two services employ
women in more "non-traditional" roles when compared with the
Air Force and the Navy. If this does affect attrition, women
entering infantry MOSs could cause drastic inflation of the
attrition rates unless a better process of selection is
available to access those best qualified for infantry
training.
The current attrition rates in the infantry MOSs,
especially those losses occurring early in the service term,
highlight the need for a better selection process. This
improved assignment process would serve to improve the current
force and would be in place to "fit" the best qualified person
to the infantry field regardless of gender.
D. THE WARRIOR ETHOS
Major General G.A. Deegan writes that "the development of
a successful warrior is hard to describe— it is much more a
state of mind than it is physical abilities or knowledge"
(Marine Corps Gazette, Sept. 1992, p. 42). He further states
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that "no amount of education or logic will cause a young
Marine to attack an enemy position. They don't deliberately
think about it-it just happens. In many ways the warrior
spirit is like a cult". Deegan likens this warrior spirit to
"confidence that they can carry on in the face of impossible
odds". This confidence, in part results from "a feeling of
physical strength and superiority over the enemy."
The warrior spirit embodies sacrifice, courage,
confidence, physical and emotional strength, the ability to
bond with others in the pursuit of a common goal and a litany
of other characteristics. In short, it is something like the
cult as described by Deegan. Is it possible to define
predictors for a criterion that is itself difficult to define?
At this point criteria need to be defined in conceptual versus
actual terminology. A conceptual criterion, as defined by
Muchinsky, is a theoretical construct, an abstract idea that
can never be measured. It is an ideal set of factors that
constitute a successful person. However, since conceptual
criterion are theoretical abstractions there needs to be a way
to transpose them into "measurable, real factors." This is
accomplished through the use of actual criteria. For example,
two conceptual criteria for a successful college student might
be intellectual growth and emotional growth. Actual criteria
used to measure these two conceptual criteria could be grade
point average and an advisor's rating of emotional maturity.
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Though there is no way to measure, in the absence of
actual combat, such concepts as emotional or physical courage
that are undoubtably attributes of a warrior, tests can
measure an individual's physical capacity and level of
aggressiveness. While there will be less than 100 percent
validity and reliability in translating these measurements to
combat proficiency, a Marine infantryman must be capable of
"locating, seeking out, closing with, and destroying the enemy
by fire and maneuver." (Marine Corps Institute, 1985, p. 4)
If lacking necessary physical capabilities, a Marine could
fail in any or all four of the above areas. If lacking
aggressiveness, though capable of defending himself and his
unit in defensive actions, a Marine may lack what is required
in offensive engagements.
Currently Marine Corps enlistment selection standards for
infantry personnel do not measure the applicant's physical
abilities or personality traits. Only a cognitive measure is
used as a qualifier, and no MOSs have a lower standard than
that used for infantry option Marines. The "cutting edge" of
the Marine Corps has been and is the infantryman on the
"pointed end of the sword." Is there a better way to select
a force of "warriors" than is currently in place? Are current
selection procedures adequate to assimilate women into
infantry positions?
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E. ASVAB COMPARISONS BY GENDER
As detailed in the previous chapter, the MM composite of
the ASVAB test was determined to be a better predictor of an
individual's ability to successfully accomplish infantry job
standards than the GT composite. Figures 6 and 7 provide a
comparison of how males and females score on these two
composites. The scores used are all male sergeants and below
currently serving in 03XX MOSs on active duty and all female
Marine sergeants and below regardless of MOS currently serving
on active duty.
As Figure 6 illustrates the gender GT composite results
are very similar. However, males tend to score higher on the
MM composite as indicated by Figure 7. The mean and standard
deviation for males on the MM composite are 106.1 and 7.86
compared with the females mean and standard deviation of 95.26
and 10.64. Failure to consider this difference could lead to
the average female starting out at a disadvantage when
compared with the average male in infantry training.
F. CONCEPTS IMPACTING PERSONNEL DECISIONS
1. Successive Selection Strategy. Contrasted with
vocational guidance strategy and pure selection strategy,
successive selection strategy allows for both the individual
and the organization's needs to be met. Vocational guidance
attempts to match the individual with his or her wants or
preferences. An example is an individual's choice of what
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major to pursue upon entering college. The decision is made
by the individual not by the institution. Pure selection
strategy is at the other extreme in that it maximizes the
organization's, and not the individual's, values. This
strategy places only the most qualified people in a job. This
results in highly qualified employees but many applicants who
are not employed and an organization that may have gaps in its
work force because it is hiring only the "best" personnel.
Successive selection strategy is a compromise between
vocational guidance and pure selection strategy. In this
method, all jobs are filled by at least minimally qualified
people. Given the available jobs, people are placed in those
that will make the best use of their talents (Muchinsky, 1993,
p. 175)
.
2. Multiple hurdles. In the multiple-hurdle strategy,
applicants must get satisfactory scores on a number of
predictor variables (or hurdles) that are administered over
time (Muchinsky, 1993, p. 167). This strategy is used for
assignment to jobs whose significance to an organization
"warrants an extensive selection program." The Marine Corps'
"hurdles" for assignment into infantry specialties are minimal
as discussed previously. Because the infantry is the "cutting
edge" of the Corps, there should be a better system in place
with more realistic hurdles to select and assign the best
applicants to these front-line positions.
3. Predictor-Criterion Relationship. Unless a predictor
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has perfect validity, there will always be mistakes made in
the selection and assignment process. The goal of that
process should be to make as few mistakes as possible.
Through the use of a scatterplot using criterion and predictor
axis, a picture will emerge of where mistakes are made in the
selection procedure. Figure 8 shows the predictor-criterion
relationship using only the criterion cutoff. The criterion
cutoff is the point that separates successful (above) from
unsuccessful (below) employees (Muchinsky, 1993, p. 158). The
organization determines what is successful or unsuccessful
performance.
Figure 9 shows the predictor-criterion relationship using
only the predictor cutoff. The predictor score is the point
that separates accepted (right) from rejected (left)
applicants (Muchinsky, 1993, p. 158).
Figure 10 combines the predictor and criterion cutoffs
and forms four quadrants that are composed of four groups of
people. Each group is identified by a letter.
Personnel grouped in quadrant A are to the right of the
predictor cutoff and above the criterion cutoff. These are
people who met all predictor tests, were hired and became
successful employees. Personnel in this group are designated
as true positives.
Personnel grouped in quadrant B are to the left of the
predictor cutoff and below the criterion cutoff. These are
people who did not pass the predictor tests, were not hired
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and would have been deemed unsuccessful employees if they had
been hired. Personnel in this group are designated as true
negatives.
Personnel grouped in quadrant C are to the left of the
predictor cutoff but above the criterion cutoff. These are
people who failed the predictor tests, were not hired but if
they had been hired would have been successful employees.
Personnel in this group are designated as false negatives.
Personnel grouped in quadrant D are to the right of the
predictor cutoff but below the criterion cutoff. These are
people who passed the predictor tests, were hired but who are
performing their jobs unsatisfactorily. Personnel in this
group are designated as false positives.
The prevailing attrition rate of 03XX Marines indicates
that the Marine Corps has a problem with "false positive"
personnel. Simply moving the predictor cutoff to the right
will result in less false positives but more false negatives.
The key to reducing both types of selection errors is to
increase the validity of the predictor (s) . The greater the
validity of the predictor, the smaller the chance that people
will be mistakenly classified (Muchinsky, 1993, p. 160). This
points to the Marine Corps' use of the GT composite as the
primary predictor of successful 03XX performance as being
lacking.
The Army's attempt to use a physical predictor prior to
assignment into a job specialty has been previously
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documented. The Marine Corps' use of only a cognitive
predictor is reinforced by the many studies that seek to
demonstrate the superiority of cognitive ability tests in
predicting job performance. However, Day and Silverman write
that personality variables can be significant predictors of
job performance when carefully matched with the appropriate
occupation and organization. A contrast is drawn between a
fireman's job and an accountant's job. While use of a
cognitive predictor might make a significant contribution to
successful performance of both jobs, personality traits that
are important for success as an accountant are unlikely to be
the same ones demonstrated by successful firefighters. Given
a large pool of personality variables, different sets of
variables will be relevant to distinct types of occupations
(Day and Silverman, 1989, p. 26). Day and Silverman conclude:
There is a place for personality measures when they are
properly matched to a particular occupation and
organization. Incorporating personality measures along
with cognitive ability may enhance the prediction of job
performance through their incremental validity by
improving on the base rate of a selection strategy.
Choosing work-related personality measures on the basis of
information gathered from a thorough job and
organizational analysis can help improve employee
selection. The contribution of personality in shaping who
tends to perform well or remain in an organization should
not be overlooked. (Day and Silverman, 1989, p. 35)
G. SUMMARY
This chapter has identified the current selection and
assignment process that the Marine Corps uses to fill its
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infantry MOSs. It has also identified the high rates of
attrition of first term Marines assigned to infantry MOSs. It
attempts to show that the process needs to be re-evaluated now
to circumvent personnel and monetary losses due to early
attrition. This attrition rate will increase when women are
granted entry into infantry MOSs if the Canadian model serves
as a correct example. While maintaining a cognitive predictor
such as the MM composite as one predictor, there are other
strategies such as successive selection and multiple hurdles
that could be employed to provide a better "fit" between
potential Marines and the infantry MOSs.
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Currently women do not serve in job specialties that fall
under the new definition of direct combat. However, it is not
unrealistic to assume that at some future point the services
will be required to fill all jobs with the best person with no
regard to gender. Because of the physical, aggression level
and cognitive differences separating the average male and the
average female, attrition problems will be exacerbated unless
better predictors than are currently in place are found to
select and assign enlistees to the infantry MOSs.
At present the Marine Corps attrition of first-term 03XX
Marines creates serious problems. Recruiters have to fill
holes caused by attrition, Fleet Marine Force units are
burdened with separation proceedings and the budget process is
impacted because of re-training costs. A better selection
process needs to be implemented now to better fit qualified
males for infantry specialties and to be in place to identify
and assimilate females who are capable of filling 03XX
specialties. This new process should use the successive
selection and multiple hurdle strategies outlined in the
previous chapter.
As shown by the CNA study presented in Chapter III, the MM
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composite is a better predictor than the GT composite of an
individual's ability to successfully meet infantry training
standards. As such, the MM composite should be used as the
predictor for an applicant's cognitive ability to meet
infantry job specifications. This should not be viewed as
encroachment on more technical MOSs, such as aircraft
maintenance, which also use MM scores for assignment. While
MM would be used as a cognitive predictor for infantry MOSs,
a lower MM cut-off could be set for assignment as an 03XX than
for assignment as an aircraft mechanic.
A job analysis that could determine strength requirements
for Marines in infantry job specialties should be undertaken.
This analysis should measure what is expected from a Marine in
a war scenario and not in a peacetime environment. Studies
show that lean muscle mass has a direct effect on an
individual's strength and aerobic capacity. As discussed in
Chapter 2 , the strength disparity between the genders narrows
when strength is compared relative to fat-free weight. In
conjunction with the job analysis measuring strength
requirement, an entrance test needs to be developed that is
simple, efficient and unable to be compromised. This could be
an established cut-off for lean muscle mass (fat-free weight) .
This measurement could be obtained by taking a person's actual
weight and multiplying by the person's percentage of body fat.
For example, if an applicant weighs 140 pounds and has a body
fat percentage of 15 percent, his lean muscle mass weight
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would be 119[140-(140xl5%) ] . If the job analysis found that
the minimum requirement to perform combat related infantry
tasks, such as forced marching with combat load or manually
transporting casualties, was 115 pounds of lean muscle mass,
then the applicant would be over the physical hurdle for
infantry assignment. If the standard was set at 12 the
applicant could be assigned to another MOS or be counseled on
why he or she was not qualified, told what combination of
weight and body fat would be necessary for acceptance into the
infantry and could return to be tested at another time.
Another hurdle that could be implemented at the recruiting
station is the administration of a personality profile
measurement test. This test could serve to measure an
individual's aggression levels. Those with very low aggression
profiles could be assigned an MOS not so attuned with the
mission of the Marine infantry to seek out, close with and
destroy the enemy.
Utilization of these three hurdles would fulfill the
successive selection strategy that mandates that people be
placed in those jobs that will best use their talents. When
this occurs, both the organization and the individual's needs
are met. These predictors would also increase the assignment
of "true positives" and concurrently decrease the assignment
of "false positives" to the infantry.
85
B. CONCLUSION
Most literature concerning the very controversial topic of
women being assigned to combat specialties has focused on why
they should be given the opportunity to fight or why they
should not be tasked with this role. The question of how to
assimilate women into Marine combat arms and specifically into
the infantry MOSs has not been addressed. At some future time
this may become a reality. This thesis has identified
differences between the two genders that could impact combat
readiness if the current assignment process continues to be
implemented. Use of better predictors will allow the Marine
Corps to better fit a qualified person into an infantry
specialty. Improving the assignment process should decrease
current attrition rates. Also, if rules restricting women
from direct combat are changed, it will allow accession of
women who are more capable of meeting infantry standards than
women who would be assigned using current predictors. Failure
to address this process will result in continued high
attrition and will lead to the type of problems experienced by
the Canadian Forces if the Marine Corps is required to
assimilate women into combat arms.
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APPENDIX A
Table 1. OCCUPATIONAL FIELDS FOR WOMEN, PROCEDURES ANALYSIS
OFFICE





22 Fire Control Instrument Repair
25 Operational Communications
2 6 Communication Material
27 Electronics
3 Supply
31 Warehousing, Shipping, and Receiving
33 Food
34 Disbursing











69 Aviation Synthetic Training Devices
70 Aviation Operations and Intelligence
71 Flight Equipment
Source: Stremlow, History of the Women Marines , 1986
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TABLE 2. GROUND MPS ' S OPENED TO FEMALE MARINES
2 3 62 Ground Nuclear Weapons Assembly Technician
2 671 Cryptologic Linguist
572 Ground Nuclear Weapons Assembly Officer
5907 Ground Launched Missile Maintenance Officer
5907 Ground Launched Missile Maintenance Officer
5921-5929 Hawk Missile Systems Technicians
594 3 Aviation Fire Control Repairer
5947 Aviation Fire Control Technician
72 04 Antiair Warfare Officer
7222 Hawk Missile System Operator
Source: Marine Corps Public Affairs Office, "Questions an7
Answers," January 27,1994.
TABLE 3. AIR MPS ' s OPENED TO FEMALE MARINES
6031-6032 Aircraft Flight Engineer, KC-130
7371 Aerial Navigator Trainee
7372 First Navigator
7380 Aerial Navigation Officer
7381-7382 Airborne Radio Operator/Loadmaster
75XX Pilot/Naval Flight Officer
Source: Marine Corps Public Affairs Office, "Questions and
Answers," January 27, 1994.
TABLE 4. UNITS OPENED TO FEMALE MARINES
Communications Company, Marine Division
Firing and H&S Batteries, Light Anti-Air Missile Battalions
Source: Marine Corps Public Affairs Office, "Questions and
Answers," January 27, 1994.
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0451 Air Delivery Specialist




18XX Tank and Assault Amphibious Vehicle
2110 Ordnance Vehicle Maintenance Officer
2131 Artillery Weapons/Turret Repairer
2141 Assault Amphibian Vehicle Repairer/Technician
2143 Self-Propelled Artillery Repairer /Technician
2145 Tracked Vehicle Repairer, Tank
2147 LAV Repairer
2149 Ordnance Vehicle Technician
2305 Explosive Ordnance Disposal Officer
2336 Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technician
6015 Aircraft Mechanic, AV-8
6038 Maintenance Specialist, AV-8
6112-6115 Helicopter Mechanic
6172-6176 Helicopter Crew Chief
72 07 Forward Air Controller
7208 Air Support Control Officer
7212 Stinger Missile Gunner
7242 Air Support Operations Operator
Source: Marine Corps Order 1300.8.
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TABLE 6. UNITS CLOSED TO FEMALE MARINES








Air/Naval Gunfire Liaison Company
Combat Engineer Battalion




Sensor Control and Management Platoons
Source: Marine Corps Order 1300.8.





HEIGHT (IN) 68.9 64.1 -4.8
WEIGHT (LB) 160.4 128.7 -31.7
LEAN MASS (LB) 133.5 96.1 -37.4
FAT MASS (LB) 26.9 32.6 5.7
% BODY FAT 16.8 25.3 8.5
Source: Myers et al, "ARI Validation of the Military Physica
Strength Capacity Test, US Army Research Institute," 1984.
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Table 8. , CORRELATION OF PHYSICAL
COMPOSITION
PERFORMANCE AND BODY
PERCENT BODY FAT FAT-FREE MASS
Men Women Men Women
Maximum
box lift
0.06 0.10 0.45 0.26
Two-mile
run
0.51 0.42 0.01 -0.05
Source: Sharp, "Physical Fitness, Physical Training and
Occupational Performance of Men and Women in the U.S. Army: A
Review of Literature," 1993.
TABLE 9. USARIEM MOS PHYSICAL DEMAND CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM
MOS Cluster Lifting Capacity Aerobic Capacity
Alpha >40 kg >2.25 1/min
Bravo >40 kg 1.5-2.25 1/min
Charlie >40 kg <1.5 1/min
Delta 30-40 kg <1.5 1/min
Echo <3 0kg <1.5 1/min
Source: Teves, et al, "Performance on Selected Candidate Screening
Test Procedures Before and After Army Basic and Advanced Individual
Training," 1985.
TABLE 10. MODIFIED DOL PHYSICAL DEMAND CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM
Occasional Lifting Frequent Lifting
(<20% of time) (20%<of time<80%)
Light 20 lb 10 lb
Medium 50 lb 25 lb
Moderately Heavy 80 lb 40 lb
Heavy 100 lb 50 lb
Very Heavy 100 lb >100 lb
Source: Teves, et al, "Performance on Selected Candidate Screening
rest Procedures Before and After Army Basic and Advanced Individual
Training, " 1985.
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TABLE 11. ASVAB SUBTESTS
Subtest Minutes/ Iterns Description
General
Science (GS)









11/35 Measures ability to select
correct meaning of words
presented in context and to










3/50 Measures ability to perform




7/84 Measures ability to assign





11/25 Measures knowledge of









19/25 Measures knowledge of
mechanical and physical






9/20 Measures knowledge of
electricity and electronics.
Source: DoD, ASVAB Counselor's Manual . 1989.
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TABLE 12. MOSs WITH SAMPLE SIZE





0369 Inf. unit leader 387
Source: Mayberry and Carey. "Relationship Between ASVAB and
Mechanical Maintenance Job Performance," 1993.
TABLE 13. VALIDITIES FOR
TEST
APTITUDE COMPOSITES AGAINST HANDS-ON
MOS GT MM EL CL
Sample Values
0311 .47 .52 .46 .34
0331 .53 .57 .56 .43
0341 .43 .55 .45 .25
0351 .42 .45 .44 .32
0369 .48 .49 .47 .40
Corrected Values
0311 .62 .66 .61 .51
0331 .70 .72 .72 .62
0341 .48 .60 .49 .30
0351 .51 .54 .53 .41
0369 .60 .60 .59 .51
Source: Maybi=rry and Cai:ey, "Relatic>nship Between ASVAB and
Mechanical Maintenance Job Performance," 1993.
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TABLE 14. PREREQUISITES FOR ASSIGNMENT TO INFANTRY OPTION
MOS Vision License , Driver Minimum GT
0311 NA NA 80
0313 20/200,20/20 Current 90
0331 NA NA 80
0341 NA NA 80
0351 20/200,20/20 Current 80
0352 20/200,20/20 NA 90
Source: Marine Corps Order 1130. 53L
Table 15. MOS 03XX ATTRITION RATES, FY 1989 COHORT
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
ATT % 14.61 7.71 5.51 4.59 5.28 6.15 6.41
STAY % 85.39 78.81 74.47 71.05 67.30 63.16 59.11
Source: Derived from data provided by Headquarters Marine Corps,
Manpower Analysis Branch.
Table 16. MOS 25XX ATTRITION RATES, FY 1989 COHORT
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
ATT % 12.55 1.49 3.67 5.02 5.48 6.82 6.81
Stay % 87.45 86.15 82.99 78.82 74.50 69.42 64.69
Source: Derived from data provided by Headquarters Marine Corps,
Manpower Analysis Branch.
Table 17. MOS 35XX ATTRITION RATES, FY 1989 COHORT
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
ATT % 12.58 1.78 3.96 5.50 5.59 6.92 7.68
Stay % 87.42 85.87 82.49 77.95 73.59 68.50 63.24
Source: Derived from data provided by Headquarters Marine Corps,
Manpower Analysis Branch.
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Table 18. MOS 01XX ATTRITION RATES, FY 1989 COHORT
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
ATT % 13.02 3.09 4.24 4.99 5.97 6.28 5.19
Stay % 86.98 84.29 80.72 76.69 72.11 67.58 64.07
Source: Derived from data provided by Headquarters Marine Corps,
Manpower Analysis Branch.
Table 19. MOS 13XX ATTRITION RATES, FY 1989 COHORT
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
ATT % 13.08 2.96 3.90 4.80 6.14 7.83 7.68
Stay % 86.92 84.35 81.06 77.17 72.43 66.76 61.63
Source: Derived from data provided by Headquarters Marine Corps,
Manpower Analysis Branch.
Table 20. FEMALE ATTRITION BY SERVICE
COHORT
FY84 FY85 FY86 FY87
ARMY .40 .37 .38 .37
USMC .42 .46 .46 .46
NAVY .25 .29 .29 .29
AIR FORCE .26 .28 . .28 .29














Figure 1. Isometric Lifting Strength of Men and Women
Source: Park, "Physical Fitness, Physical Training and
Occupational Performance of Men and Women in the
U.S. Army," 1993.
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Figure 3. Isometric Lifting Strength of Men and Women Relative
to Fat-Free Weight
Source: Parks, "Physical Fitness, Physical Training and
Occupational Performance of Men and Women in the
U.S. Army," 1993.
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Figure k. Upper Torso Muscular Strength Scores for Navy Women
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Figure 5. Maximum Lifting Strength (KG)
Source: Sharp, Physical Fitness and Training of Men and

































Figure 6. Gender GT Composite Comparisons
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Figure 7. Gender MM Composite Comparisons










Figure 8. Criterion Cutoff







Figure 9. Predictor Cutoff
Source: Muchinsky, Psychology Applied ? "7ork . 19?
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Appendix C
Occupational Fields for Women Officers
Occupational fields in which women officers are eligible to serve, and percentages in each, as of31 December 1976.
•1 PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION
82 INTELLIGENCE
M LOGISTICS
13 ENGINEER AND SHORE PARTY
14 DRAFTING, SURVEYING, AND MAPPING
15 PRINTINGAND REPRODUCTION
21 ORDNANCE















4f TRAINING AND TRAINING AIDS
55 BAND










73 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL









































Occupational Fields for Enlisted Women
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Occupational Fields for Women Officers
Occupational fields in which women officers were eligible to serve, and percentages in each, as of 23 January 1994.






18 TANKAND ASSAULT VEHICLES
21 ORDNANCE
























72 AK CONTROL/SUPPORT/ANTIAIR WARFARE
73 AQt TRAFFIC CONTROL
99 IDENTIFYING AND REPORTING MOS's
NO. PERCENTAGE PERCENTAGE
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